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Judicial Reform in Afghanistan: A Case
Study in the New Criminal Procedure
Code
By FAIZ AHMED*
"[T]here is no rule of law in this country yet."
- U.N. Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi, speaking in Kabul after the Afghan
provisional government approved a new constitution'
Introduction
On January 4, 2004, the Islamic Transitional State of Afghanistan
ratified a constitution.2 The document has been widely praised as an
auspicious milestone for a country torn apart by a quarter-century of brutal
occupation and civil war, particularly in its bringing together of diverse
elements of the splintered country under a grand constitutional
convention-the Loya Jirga-where delegates agreed upon a core set of
principles to govern the making of a new Afghanistan.3 Prominent Afghan
officials, U.N. representatives, and Western legal scholars have lauded the
constitution with such descriptions as "a historic achievement, ' 4 "a model
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2006; B.A.,
University of California, Berkeley, 2002. This note grew from personal research while
working in Kabul as an intern for the International Legal Foundation, Ltd. (ILF). The views
expressed are my own and do not reflect those of the ILF. I would like to thank my family
for their constant patience and support, Professor George Bisharat for his comments and
advice, and of course, the entire ILF staff- for all that they taught me about law and society
in Afghanistan.
1. Roland Flamini, Afghans Write Constitution Version, THE WASH. TIMES (Jan. 10,
2004), available at <www.washtimes.com/world/20040109-085157-1139r.htm>.
2. Afghan Charter Wins World Praise, BBC NEWS, at
<news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south-asia/3367847.stm> (visited Nov. 29, 2005).
3. Id.
4. Quote from U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan. Id.
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for the Islamic world,"5 and a process in which "there is no winner or
loser---everybody has won."6  In spite of such praise, a number of the
document's articles have been the subject of debate and controversy within
Afghanistan. 7 As a leading case in point, Articles 25-32 pronounce the
need for a sound system of criminal procedure that ensures basic due
process rights to defendants and prohibits coercive acts by prosecutors.8
The details and definitions, however, are filled in by a new criminal
procedure code, recently drafted by Italian jurists hired by the Italian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.9 The code has thus been criticized by some as
a foreign imposition of law,' ° while defended by others as a necessary and
5. Quote from Noah Feldman, Professor of Law at New York University. See Noah
Feldman, A New Democracy, Enshrined in Faith, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 13, 2003.
6. Quote from Afghan President Hamid Karzai. Afghan Charter Wins World Praise,
supra note 2. Within Afghanistan, a group of 20 delegates to the Loya Jirga headed by
Abdul Hafez Mansur claimed that the document signed into law by Mr. Karzai did not
exactly conform to the draft agreed upon at the Loya Jirga. Kabir Ranjbar, head of the
Afghan Lawyers Association, responded on January 29 by saying that while the draft of the
constitution approved by the Loya Jirga was indeed altered, these "changes do not affect the
content of the constitution and are not something to be taken seriously." See Amin Tarzi,
Hurdles in Implementing the New Afghan Constitution, RADIO FREE EuROPE/RADIO LIBERTY
AFGHANISTAN REPORT, at Vol. 3, No. 5, at <www.rferl.org/reports/afghan-report/2004/02/5-
050204.asp> (visited Nov. 29, 2005). The single notable international criticism has
emanated from the Brussels-based International Crisis Group (ICG), claiming the
constitutional drafting process was unfair and ill-informed. The ICG alleged in a report that
the process favored certain factions over others. Afghan and U.N. officials have on the
whole rejected the ICG report, saying it reached premature conclusions on a process that
had barely started. See Sanjoy Majumder, Afghan Constitution Claims Rejected, BBC
NEWS, at <news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/southasia/2999700.stm> (visited Nov. 29, 2005).
7. Tarzi, supra note 6; Golnaz Esfandiari, Loya Jirga Approves Constitution, But Hard
Part May Have Only Just Begun, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY AFGHANISTAN
REPORT, at Vol. 3, No. 1, at <www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/01/a2ad922a-adlf-4194-
8b43-bf5b47f5427e.html> (visited Jan. 8, 2004).
8. Qanoon-i-Asasi Afghanistan/Da Afghanistan Asasi Qanoon [The Constitution
of Afghanistan (Year 1382/2004)], available at <www.afghan-
web.com/politics/currentconstitutiondaripashto.pdf>, at 7-9. An English translation of the
2004 Constitution is available at <www.afghan-
web.com/politics/currentconstitutionenglish.pdf>. The official version, however, is only in
Dari and Pashto.
9. L 'Afghanistan e la Comunita Internazionale, una Partnership Per il Futuro, Italian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Mar. 31, 2004), available at
<www.esteri.it/ita/6 38 90 01.asp?id=1074&mod=3&min=l>; Criminal Justice and
Human Rights Training Programs in Afghanistan: A Report on ISISC Projects
from July 2003 through July 2004, available at
<www.isisc.org/docs/July.2004_Report_ISISCProgramsAfghanistan.htm>.
10. For a timely and introductory (though broadly argued) study on imposed
constitutionalism, see Stanley N. Katz, Gun Barrel Democracy? Democratic
Constitutionalism Following Military Occupation: Reflections on the U.S. Experience in
Japan, Germany, Afghanistan and Iraq, (Princeton Law and Public Affairs Working Paper
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positive step toward establishing a "rule of law" in Afghanistan.l
This note investigates the advantages and drawbacks of a criminal
procedure code in Afghanistan, and compares national codification to the
alternative of maintaining the decentralized tribal jirgas as the normative
systems of adjudication in Afghanistan, the latter approach preserving the
legal authority of local tribal counsels in Afghanistan's diverse, multiethnic
provinces. Historically, the Afghan jirgas (also known as shuras) have
fulfilled the normative role of day-to-day dispute resolution and
maintaining legal order in Afghanistan's decentralized provinces, as well as
in the North West Frontier and Balochistan provinces of neighboring
Pakistan, the latter areas being the native lands of numerous Pashtun tribes
and home to millions of Afghan refugees since the Soviet invasion in
1979.2
Series, Paper No. 04-010, Social Science Research Network electronic library), available at
<papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=559166>. For additional critiques on
neoliberal restructuring in contemporary developing countries (in both legal and political
realms), see KIMBERLY ZISK MARTEN, ENFORCING THE PEACE: LEARNING FROM THE
IMPERIAL PAST 1-21, 59-92 (2004); and with particular attention to Muslim states, DEREK
GREGORY, THE COLONIAL PRESENT: AFGHANISTAN, PALESTINE, AND IRAQ 145-79 (2004).
11. While clearly a common term used by international legal analysts to refer to stable
legal orders, "rule of law" is often assumed to be a value-neutral term. In truth, its usage
has not passed without significant controversy and debate, though it is beyond the scope of
this article to engage in polemics on this term. For further reading on this topic, see LAURA
NADER, THE LIFE OF THE LAW: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PROJECTS (2002). For instance,
Professor Nader comments: "Research on law and state power illustrates that, far from being
neutral, law is often politically active, created by and for groups in power (Barnes 1961).
This realization often separates anthropologists from development lawyers, who even today
may still believe that 'the rule of law' creates a level playing field that works out in
practice." Id. at 6. See also UGO MATTEI, COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS (1998):
"Most less developed countries do not share either one or both of the basic legal
assumptions of the rule of law as understood by the more developed countries that compose
the Western legal tradition. In many countries.., the political process and the legal process
overlap. In others ... the domain of law and that of religious beliefs overlap." Id. at 227.
Therefore, this article defines a rule of law not as a tangible political or legal condition, nor
a political system based on Western notions of liberal democracy, but as a conceptual goal
in which all members of a society (regardless of wealth or status) normatively abide by
publicly known limits, and face legally-sanctioned punishment for transgressing them. For
a particularly insightful discussion of "rule of law" concepts in post-conflict or transitional
justice contexts, see RAMA MANI, BEYOND RETRIBUTION: SEEKING JUSTICE IN THE SHADOWS
OF WAR 25-31 (2002).
12. OLIVIER Roy, ISLAM AND RESISTANCE IN AFGHANISTAN 20-29 (2nd ed., 1990). M.
Nazif Shahrani, The Future of the State and the Structure of Community Governance in
Afghanistan, in FUNDAMENTALISM REBORN? AFGHANISTAN AND THE TALIBAN 221-24
(William Maley ed., 2001); Bert Glatzer, Is Afghanistan on the Brink of Ethnic and Tribal
Disintegration?, in FUNDAMENTALISM REBORN? AFGHANISTAN AND THE TALiBAN 173-78
(William Maley ed., 2001). For a discussion of Pakistan's relationship with tribal areas
along the Afghan border, see Francois Tanguay-Renaud, Post-Colonial Pluralism, Human
20051
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While financial pledges to aid in Afghanistan's reconstruction remain
scandalously unfulfilled by most participants,1 3 recent policy reviews
indicate that the chief problem in rebuilding Afghanistan is not a shortage
of funds for reconstruction per se, but the lack of local human capacity to
implement proposed tasks.' 4 The closing of schools and destruction of
educational institutions, a global diaspora of Afghan professionals, and
decades of war are frequently cited as the root causes of this skilled labor
shortage. 15 In this manner several aid agencies working in Afghanistan
after the fall of the Taliban have launched ambitious training programs for
a variety of important services and civil servant positions, including judges,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, municipal police forces, a national army,
and health care personnel, just to name a few.
16
At first glance, such initiatives seem praiseworthy and instrumental to
the building of a modem Afghan state in the twenty-first century. At the
same time, there have been little or no critical evaluations of such reform
projects in the context of Afghanistan's complex political, ethnic, and
sociocultural predicaments, or in light of Afghanistan's extremely turbulent
history with foreign intervention. Are Afghans taking a leading position in
Rights & the Administration of Criminal Justice in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
of Pakistan, 6 SING. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 541 (2002).
13. Leila Search-Zalmai, Special Report on Afghanistan Reconstruction Aid
Effectiveness: One Year Later, DEVELOPMENT GATEWAY, at
<topics.developmentgateway.org/afghanistan/sdm/previewDocument.do-activeDocumentld
=428010> (visited Jan. 22, 2003). Parsimony has not been limited to the predominantly-
Western donor states that made pledges at Bonn; see, e.g., Muslim Countries Have Done
Little to Help Afghanistan: Afghan Official, Pakistani Tribune (June 26, 2005), available at
<paktribune.com/news/index.php?id= 110637>.
14. See, e.g., ESTABLISHING THE RULE OF LAW IN AFGHANISTAN, UNITED STATES
INSTITUTE OF PEACE: SPECIAL REPORT 117, (Mar. 2004), available at
<www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/srl17.html> [hereinafter USIP SPECIAL REPORT 117].
"The nearly uniform view of observers inside and outside the justice system in Afghanistan
is that the greatest need in building the system is to improve the quality of judicial
personnel." Id.
The justice system and law enforcement suffer from a very low level of human
resource and physical infrastructure capacity... Virtually nothing has been done
to update the court structure, establish and apply qualifications for judicial
personnel (Afghan legal experts consider many judges to be unqualified), ensure
widespread access to legal texts for practitioners and students, develop court
administration, improve the quality of legal education, or address deep-rooted
corruption.
Id.
15. Raz Mohammad, Afghanistan Since the Bonn Agreement: Tasks, Opportunities, and
Barriers for Peacebuilding-An International Alert Discussion Paper, at 2, 5 (April 2002),
available at <www.international-alert.org/publications/getdata.php?doctype=Pdf&id=76>.
16. USIP SPECIAL REPORT 117, supra note 14.
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the development of their legal system? Are diverse elements of Afghan
society being incorporated into the legal reform process? Is the
relationship between foreign aid agencies and local Afghan legal actors
characterized by a cooperative partnership, or an employer-employee
relationship? This paper seeks to raise and address these critical questions
pertaining to legal reform in contemporary Afghanistan.
Taking the new criminal procedure code as a case study, this note
reviews the process of the code's adoption, its perceived benefits, and its
role in the larger scheme of judicial reform in post-Taliban Afghanistan. It
argues that the adoption of the new criminal procedure code embodies
several defects that are instructive of larger problems in law and
development movements, including the foreign imposition of law, a lack of
local participation in legal reform processes, and a blindness to the multiple
layers of indigenous law practiced on the ground by focusing exclusively
on official state law - all weaknesses that will fundamentally hamper the
rebuilding of stable legal institutions in Afghanistan in the long term.
Specific problems with the new criminal procedure code include: (1) the
instituting of a foreign-designed document with little or no local Afghan
involvement in the drafting process; (2) a lack of foresight in addressing
the practical difficulties with implementing a code in Afghanistan's
decentralized provinces, including overlooking a turbulent history of
province-vs.-center conflict; (3) a need for including and respecting the
diversity of Afghanistan's legal traditions, especially in rural provinces
where unofficial, non-state-sponsored "customary law" mechanisms
govern; and finally (4) in the desire to professionalize Afghanistan's legal
system(s), aid agencies are excluding critical non-state actors on the
ground, including prominent religious and tribal leaders, thereby
exacerbating the problem of low capacity for implementing desired legal
and political reforms.
I. Legal Reform in Afghanistan in the Twentieth Century
A sincere analysis of the contemporary judicial reform movement in
Afghanistan must begin by contextualizing current initiatives with
Afghanistan's history, in particular the tumultuous center-periphery
conflict that has strained relations between Kabul and the provinces
throughout the twentieth century. State power in Afghanistan has
historically been concentrated in the capital city of Kabul, with state
institutions virtually absent in large pockets of the rural majority. 7 The
17. Louis DUPREE, AFGHANISTAN 662 (1973). Also relevant to the theme of urban-
20051
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Afghan state has previously struggled for authority over the tribally-
governed provinces since its inception in 1747, but to little avail, and
indeed at any centralizing regime's own risk, with the autonomous tribes
largely resisting government control whether the latter emanated from
Kabul or Kandahar. 18 With regard to the state's legal reform efforts in
particular, there were two major attempts to modernize the judiciary in
Afghanistan during the twentieth century. The first took place in what
became known as the Nizamnama period of the 1920s, and the second
under the 1964 Constitution.' 9 Afghan historian Senzil Nawid's work,
Religious Response to Social Change in Afghanistan: 1919-29, illustrates
how the Nizamnama reforms instituted by the Afghan King Amanullah in
the 1920s attempted to modernize (along liberal Western lines) such broad
areas of social life as rural education, women's roles, and prevalent
marriage customs, only to conclude in abysmal failure. 20 As a testament to
the ambitious leader's defeat, widespread revolt eventually forced
Amanullah's abdication, thereby establishing the legacy of Kabul's "hands
off' approach to the provincial tribes which would last until the Communist
regimes and eventual Soviet invasion of the late 1970s.21 Compared to the
Nizamnama, the reforms of the 1960s focused on constitutional reform, and
overall were seen as less radical and more realistic in the context of
22Afghanistan's decentralized tribally-administered provinces. This latter
view arises because the 1960s reforms did not target sensitive social or
cultural norms of Afghans in its mandate.23 Dr. Mohammad Hashim
Kamali, an Afghan legal scholar and professor of Islamic jurisprudence,
writes:
It is not accidental that the 1960s experiment in legal reform was less
rural dynamics that runs throughout this note, Middle East historian Edmund Burke III
writes,
As in Morocco, Yemen, and Iran, other Islamic states where pastoralist tribal
forces maintained their power into the twentieth century against weak
governments, the politics of Afghanistan have been characterized by sharp conflict
between the forces of tradition rooted in the countryside and the forces of change
based in the cities.
STRUGGLE AND SURVIVAL IN THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST 336 (Edmund Burke, III ed., 1993).
18. MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, LAW IN AFGHANISTAN: A STUDY OF THE
CONSTITUTIONS, MATRIMONIAL LAW AND THE JUDICIARY 5-6, 9 (1985) (KAMALI, LAW IN
AFGHANISTAN); OLIv1ER Roy, supra note 12, at 13-14.
19. Id. at 14-15.
20. SENZIL K. NAWID, RELIGIOUS RESPONSE TO SOCIAL CHANGE IN AFGHANISTAN 1919-
29: KING AMAN-ALLAH AND THE AFGHAN ULAMA (1999).
21. Id.
22. KAMALI, LAW IN AFGHANISTAN, supra note 18, at 15.
23. Id.
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ambitious than the Nizamnama legislation over four decades previously.
Indeed the failure of the Nizamnama reforms which culminated in the
dramatic downfall of Amanullah has strongly influenced the scope and
content of law reform in the 1960s. The fear, real or imaginary of
provoking a similar reaction among the religious and tribal conservatives
thwarted the reformist zeal of the Afghan leaders for decades to come.
24
As the crowning achievement of the 1960s reforms, the Afghan
government ratified a new constitution in 1964, since praised as a practical
compromise between the state bureaucracy's modernizing elements and the
mainly autonomous provincial tribes, as well as for its high level of popular
participation.25 The latter view arises because of the greater role public
consultation and debate played in determining its contents (as compared to
the previous constitutions), and the participation of large contingents of
delegates from provinces all over Afghanistan in the 1964 Loya Jirga
constitutional assembly.2 6 In this manner the constitution of 1964 was the
first and most significant attempt at establishing an independent judiciary
under the supervision of a Supreme Court, proclaiming the judiciary as an
"independent organ of the state which discharges its duties side by side
with the legislative and executive organs., 27  The ratification of this
constitution thus marks the formal instituting of an officially state-
sponsored but independent judiciary in Afghanistan.28 On a broader level
the 1964 Loya Jirga and its accomplishments, achieved through
consultation, ushered in a period of relative stability and national peace that
has come to be remembered by Afghans as the "Decade of Democracy,"
"the New Era," or "the Constitutional Period., 29 Growth in this realm was
short-lived, however, as the widespread chaos and trauma of consecutive
military coups and Soviet occupation during the 1973-1991 years
effectively destroyed the national accomplishments made by popular
participation in this once-promising period.3 °
Similarly, attempts to reinstitute a functioning judiciary and rule of
24. Id. at 205.
25. Id. at 203-11.
26. Id.
27. AFG. CONST. (1964) art. 97, available in English at <www.afghan-
web.com/history/const/constl964.html>.
28. KAMALI, LAW IN AFGHANISTAN, supra note 18, at 208.
29. Afghan Constitutions, Online Center for Afghan Studies, at <www.institute-for-
afghan-studies.org/Constitutions/Constitutions.htm> (visited Oct. 2, 2005).
30. Id.; KAMALI, LAW IN AFGHANISTAN, supra note 18, at 16. For a glimpse into the
turbulent politics in Afghanistan during the 1970s and their internally divisive effects on
ordinary Afghans, see Ashraf Ghani, Gulab: An Afghan Schoolteacher, in STRUGGLE AND
SURVIVAL IN THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST, supra note 17, at 336-51.
2005]
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law after the Afghans defeated an occupying Soviet Union were stymied by
the brutal civil war and ethnic strife that followed the latter's withdrawal in
1991. 31  Extreme sociopolitical factionalism developed in the Afghan
population not only along ethnic lines but also within the broad ethnic
groups as individual tribes warred against each other in a vacuum of power
left by the Soviet withdrawal and the communist government's collapse.32
Moreover, rivaling ideologies pitted an assortment of political parties and
quasi-political militias of both Islamic and secular orientations against one
another, each with their own branches and sub-divisions, each competing
for the instruments of state control.33 The extensive intervention of
Afghanistan's neighbors-particularly Pakistan, Iran, Russia, and India-
exacerbated the bloodshed as these states supported their respective proxies
in the conflict. 34  It was in this vicious civil war environment that the
Taliban movement, with substantial financial and military support from
Pakistani and Saudi intelligence services, emerged and established control
over 90% of Afghan territory in 1996. 35 Taliban rule, most often
characterized in Western media by its draconian social policies, would last
only five years in power, however, until its removal by U.S.-led military
strikes in the Fall of 2001.36
II. Judicial Reform and Legal Aid in Post-Taliban Afghanistan
On December 5, 2001, prominent members of the Afghan diaspora
and representatives of industrialized countries from around the world
gathered in Bonn, Germany to plan the reconstruction of a war-torn
Afghanistan.37 With the Taliban removed from power and a new Afghan
government in the making, donor countries assumed responsibility for
31. BARNETT R. RUBIN, THE FRAGMENTATION OF AFGHANISTAN: STATE FORMATION




35. FUNDAMENTALISM REBORN: AFGHANISTAN AND THE TALIBAN, supra note 12, viii-ix.
For a detailed account of the Taliban movement's historical origins and politics see AHMED
RASHID, TALIBAN: MILITANT ISLAM, OIL, AND FUNDAMENTALISM IN CENTRAL ASIA (2001).
36. Craig Francis, Afghanistan: The Regime and Their U.N. Battle, CNN NEWS, at
<archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/central/04/24/taleban.profile/index.html> (visited
Nov. 29, 2005).
37. Major Powers Welcome Afghan Deal, BBC NEWS, at
<news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/southasia/1693281.stm> (visited Nov. 29, 2005). Full
provisions of the Bonn Agreement are published online, Agreement on Provisional
Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent
Govern Institutions (Dec. 5, 2001), available at
<afghangovernment.com/AfghanAgreementBonn.htm>.
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38various aspects of the rebuilding process. For example, in building a new
Afghan national army, the United States is currently training rank-and-file
soldiers, the United Kingdom its non-commissioned officers, and France
the remainder of officers. 39  Germany has primary responsibility for
training police, and a Canadian general currently commands the NATO-
administered International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).4 ° In other
realms of reconstruction, Japan has rebuilt civilian infrastructure such as
primary schools and municipal buses, China has constructed a large public
hospital in the center of Kabul, and Italy has assumed the preeminent role
in judicial reform.41
As one of its foremost contributions to Afghanistan's judicial reform,
Italy presented a complete criminal procedure code to the transitional
Afghan government in February 2004.42 At a donor conference for
Afghanistan held in Doha, Qatar in May 2004, Italian officials declared that
its new criminal procedure code for Afghanistan is "a simplified text
designed to make the work of the criminal police and judges easier and
compliant with international human rights; the Code has been adopted by
the Afghan Government., 43 The new code is to be implemented at all
levels of Afghanistan's judiciary. The present hierarchy of state-run courts
in Afghanistan includes a Kabul-based Supreme Court (Stera Mahkama),
provincial high courts of appeal, and local district courts dispersed in some
of the major cities of the country, including Kabul, Herat, Kandahar,
Nangrahar and Balkh.44
38. Id.
39. Paul Reynolds, Afghanistan nation-building at critical point, BBC NEWS, at
<news.bbc.co.uk/I/hi/world/southasia/3582677.stm> (visited Nov. 29, 2005); Mark Sedra,
Security Sector Transformation in Afghanistan, (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control
of Armed Forces, Working Paper No. 143, Aug. 2004), available at
<www.dcaf.ch/publications/WorkingPapers/143.pdf>.
40. Government of Germany, Germany's Contribution to the Reconstruction and
Development of Afghanistan, RELIEFWEB NEWS, at
<www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/bec4efdbd994d62985256b5f007213d1 ?OpenDocument>
(visited Nov. 29, 2005). For more information on ISAF's current role in Afghanistan, see
<www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/>.
41. USIP SPECIAL REPORT 117, supra note 14.
42. L 'Afghanistan e la Comunita Internazionale, una Partnership Per il Futuro, supra
note 9.
43. Conferenza Sulla Sicurezza Regionale e Coopreazione Di Polizia Sul Tema
'Riconstruzione Della Polizia In Afghanistan - Un Appoccio Regionale (May 19, 2004),
available at <www.margheritaboniver.it/conferenza_008.htm>.
44. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ASIA, REPORT NO 45, AFGHANISTAN: JUDICIAL
REFORM AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (Jan. 28, 2003), at 9, available at
<unpanl .un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPANO16653.pdf>; USIP
SPECIAL REPORT 117, supra note 14.
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Current efforts to rebuild Afghanistan's legal system are tremendously
reliant on foreign aid.45 This is evident not only in the dependency on
foreign governments fulfilling pledges from the 2002 Tokyo and 2004
Berlin donor conferences, but also in the wide-ranging role played by
international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in reconstruction.46
In the realm of legal aid specifically, NGOs such as the Asia Foundation,
USAID (and its various contracted subsidiaries), the International Legal
Foundation (ILF), International Resources Group, as well as several private
U.S. law firms and law institutes of American and European universities,
have conducted workshops designed to train a new generation of judges,
lawyers, and civil servants for the Afghan state's fledgling bureaucracy.47
Due to the shortage of official, state-sponsored legal institutions, legal
reform efforts have been most concentrated towards rebuilding judicial
capacity of the Afghan state by training a new judiciary.48 The new
criminal procedure code is a fundamental contribution in this regard.
As reflected in the Italian minister's comments at the Doha
conference, the driving inspiration behind the new code is to institute a
formal system of codification, which allegedly will aid in professionalizing
Afghans' judicial processes (which includes "educating" Afghan judges),
reduce arbitrary decision-making, and hence ultimately strengthen the rule
of law in Afghanistan.49 Codification, so it is often claimed, encourages
predictability in the law, diminishes the absolute power of otherwise
unaccountable judges, and protects the legal system from the arbitrary
decision-making of tribal elders and mullahs in rural areas, who are seen as
immune from the supervision of a sovereign state apparatus that would, in
45. Afghanistan: Donor Assistance Essential to Rebuilding Shattered
Judicial System, RELIEFWEB NEWS, at
<topics.developmentgateway.org/afghanistan/sdm/previewDocument.do-activeDocumentld
=439060> (visited Oct. 2, 2005); Michael E. O'Hanlon, The Aid and Reconstruction Agenda
for Afghanistan, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION ANALYSIS PAPER No. 13 (Dec. 19, 2001),
available at <www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/views/papers/ohanlon/20011219.htm>.
46. Donors Pledge $8.2bn Afghan Aid, BBC NEWS, at
<news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south-asia/3589437.stm> (visited Nov. 29, 2005).
47. For recent examples of such projects, see The Asia Foundation in Afghanistan, at
<www.asiafoundation.orgfLocations/afghanistan.html>; The International Legal
Foundation: Legal Aid Afghanistan Project, at <www.theilf.org>, The International
Resource Group's Rule of Law Project, at <www.irgltd.com>, and De Paul
University's Afghanistan Judicial Reform Project, at
<www.law.depaul.edu/institutescenters/ihrli/programs/rule afghanistan.asp>.
48. USIP SPECIAL REPORT 117, supra note 14.
49. Id; Conferenza Sulla Sicurezza Regionale e Coopreazione Di Polizia Sul Tema
'Riconstruzione Della Polizia In Afghanistan - Un Appoccio Regionale, supra note 43.
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their place, ensure equality before the law and its just implementation." In
addition, a code promotes judicial uniformity, extending the centralized
state structure through law to the outlaying provinces. 5' Perhaps most
50. For example, see the description of tribal adjudicatory systems in Afghanistan by
one prominent legal news agency: "The country has no codified statutes. Instead, its
religious leaders-known as mullahs-produce occasional edicts on which activity is
criminal and which punishments should be levied for infractions." Note the dichotomy
constructed between a system based on written codes, and an orally-based system such as
that in Afghanistan. The article adds the words of one commentator: "This is rule by man
rather than rule by law. The judicial system comes down to a group of elders and clergy
making decisions.... And a lot of these people don't have any schooling. There's a lot of
interpretive law based on personal judgments." While the speaker here is commenting on
the Taliban, similar views have been promoted about religious leaders in Afghanistan in
general. Sam Handlin, Justice Takes on a Different Meaning in Afghanistan, COURT TV, at
<www.courttv.com/assault on america/0928 afghanjustice_ctv.html> (visited Nov. 29,
2005); Democracy in Afghanistan: Mullahs in the Fold, Convincing Religious
Leaders to Support Afghan Democracy, NPR, at
<www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=1892052> (visited Nov. 29, 2005);
Shahabuddin Tarakhil, Some Clergy Still Oppose the Vote, INSTITUTE FOR WAR AND PEACE
REPORTING, at <www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/arr/arr 200410_143 4 eng.txt> (visited
(Oct. 26, 2004). Disdainful views of local religious leaders and tribal councils expressed by
international legal commentators are not limited to Afghanistan. See, e.g., Marie D.
Castetter, Note, Taking Law Into Their Own Hands: Unofficial and Illegal Sanctions by the
Pakistani Tribal Councils, 13 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 543 (2003).
51. Id.; Stablizing Afghanistan: A Brookings/International Crisis Group Forum (Dec. 4,
2001), available at <www.brookings.edu/comm/transcripts/20011204.htm>; JAN BOLLING &
SipPI AZERBAIJANI-MOGHADDAM, REPORT OF THE EC RAPID REACTION MECHANISM
ASSESSMENT MISSION: AFGHANISTAN, GOVERNANCE, EUROPEAN COMMISSION CONFLICT
PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT UNIT (Apr. 2002), available at
<europa.eu.int/comm/externalrelations/cpcm/cp/doc/afgrrmgovem.pdf>. Note the
attention to formal codification, national integration and uniform standardization:
Germany has already made certain commitments in favour of a national civilian o
police, acting in accordance with... international instruments on human rights
and humanitarian law to which Afghanistan already is a party. It is hoped this will
include the creation of a Code of Ethics...
Id. at 16.
Likewise important is of course the training of new prison authorities and prison
personnel, introduction of human rights standards and codes, organization of new
prison services at central and regional districts, establishment of training centres
for training personnel and preparation of training programmes and teaching
modules.
Id. at 46. "Issues such as transparency and accountability are carefully being pursued, incl.
Codes of Conduct into Principled Common Programming." Id. at 55. For a description of
remarkably parallel colonial motivations behind past codification movements in Muslim
societies, see BRINKLEY MESSICK, THE CALLIGRAPHIC STATE: TEXTUAL DOMINATION AND
HISTORY IN A MUSLIM SOCIETY (1993). For example, Messick writes,
Criminal law was an early focus of Western indignation and intervention. The
Dutch, for example, found it necessary to issue a new penal code for their Indian
Archipelago colonies, because, as the translator of al-Nawawi and Abu Shuja' put
it, it was 'clear that no civilized nation can push its respect for indigenous
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important of all, a code enshrines fundamental human rights, and is thereby
assumed to help prevent inhumane, vigilante forms of retributive justice,
often cited by international organizations as responsible for atrocious
human rights violations, particularly crimes against women. 52 Finally, so
as to combine the twin goals of promoting modem international human
rights while satisfying unavoidable local cultural demands, instituting a
code with "Islamic credentials" may even promote the positive perception
amongst Afghans as an immediate implementation of Islamic law, thus
appeasing public desire for a rule of Shari'a - likely to be a popular move
for outspoken religious leaders and their constituencies.
53
The above claims constitute major underlying justifications and a
normative reasoning pattern behind the new code's adoption, as indicated
by comments from leading foreign advisors and legal development
agencies on "the causes" of Afghanistan's judicial woes. 54 Bearing in mind
these introductory remarks, we will now examine the strength of these
claims and the meaning of codification for Afghanistan in light of its recent
history and contemporary sociopolitical realities.
institutions to the extent of sanctioning the application of barbarian punishments,
long practiced by virtually all oriental peoples.
Id. at 62. "From the point of view of the colonizers, custom had to be either standardized or
abolished altogether in favor of a unified legal system." Id. at 65.
52. Amnesty International, Afghanistan: 'No One Listens to us and No One Treats
us as Human Beings': Justice Denied to Women, at
<www.web.amnesty.org/library/index/engasaI10232003> (visited Oct. 6, 2003). Note, for
example, the recent case in Punjab, Pakistan of a woman gang raped on the orders of a tribal
assembly as retribution for her brother's crime. The case has received widespread outcry
from international human rights agencies in the United States and Europe, and is
f1equently used to underscore arguments for reforming tribal adjudication in the region.
Mukhtar Mai - History of a Rape Case, BBC NEWS, at
<news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/south-asia/4620065.stm> (visited June 28, 2005); Ash-Har
Quraishi, Six Men Found Guilty in Gang Rape, CNN NEWS, at
<archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/08/31/pakistan.gang.rape> (visited Nov.
29, 2005). Regarding the new criminal procedure code in Afghanistan, Italian ambassador
to the United Nations Aldo Mantovani stated in a 2004 speech, "[a] new Interim Criminal
Procedure Code fully in line with human rights provisions and international standards,
drafted by the Afghan authorities with the assistance of the Italian Special Coordinator, is
already in force." Note the erroneous insertion that Afghan jurists drafted the document, an
assertion contradicted by numerous reports cited in this note criticizing the foreign
character of the document. Ambassador Aldo Mantovani, Supporting Gender Justice in
Afghanistan: Opportunities and Challenges, Address of The Permanent Mission of Italy
to the United Nations (Sept. 16, 2004), available at
<www.womenwarpeace.org/issues/justice/statements/MantovaniItaly.pdf>.
53. MUHAMMAD QASIM ZAMAN, THE ULAMA IN CONTEMPORARY ISLAM: CUSTODIANS OF
CHANGE: 95-96 (2002). Zaman's work is an exceptionally well-researched and in-depth
study on the ulama of South Asia and Afghanistan.
54. See supra notes 14, 43, 50-52 and accompanying text.
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III. The New Criminal Procedure Code - A Critical Perspective
The central problem with the new criminal procedure code is one of
imposition of law. Foreign jurists drafted the document, and with little
Afghan involvement, if any at all. The Washington D.C.-based United
States Institute of Peace, a federally funded research center chartered to
promote democratization and the rule of law abroad, has acknowledged
criticism of the new code in its report Establishing the Rule of Law in
Afghanistan.55 The report mildly states "[t]his interim code has been the
subject of some controversy, as it was prepared by Italian officials with
help from U.S. military lawyers but relatively little input or support from
the Afghan justice institutions, and was reportedly adopted under strong
foreign political pressure. 56  Given the current Afghan government's
extreme reliance on the international donor community (especially the
United States) for continued economic and military support necessary in
post-conflict Afghanistan, such political pressure is not difficult to
imagine.57 In addition to the new code already being perceived by
members of the judiciary as a foreign imposition of law, when applied
within Afghanistan it may well enflame the center-vs.-provinces conflict
that has plagued the country's history throughout the twentieth century.
One of the main sources of conflict between the Afghan central
government and outer provinces in the past century has been competing
systems of law and governance. 8 On several occasions the Kabul
government has attempted to impose a unified system of law on the
provinces, but has been unable to displace local mechanisms of
adjudication and political control, as demonstrated in the failure of
Amanullah's Nizamnama reforms in the 1920s and the rejection of
communist agrarian programs in the 1980s.59 J. Alexander Thier, a
consultant to Afghanistan's Judicial Reform Commission and frequent
commentator on Afghan legal development, writes:
The historical reality is that power in Afghanistan has almost always
operated through a negotiation between the central authority and local
power-holders - and tensions between these two levels have existed for
as long as there has been a state. Even the Taliban, which exerted a
55. USIP SPECIAL REPORT 117, supra note 14.
56. Id.
57. Pam O'Toole, Aid Lifeline for Afghanistan, BBC NEWS, at
<news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/southasia/1771912.stm> (visited Nov. 29, 2005); O'Hanlon,
supra note 45.
58. KAMALI, LAW IN AFGHANISTAN, supra note 18, at 5-6, 9.
59. Id. at251; RuBIN, supra note 31.
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greater measure of central control than its immediate predecessors, was
forced to negotiate with local elites and accept a degree of local
autonomy. Most of Afghanistan has always been remote from the center,
and the infrastructure is insufficient to impose high levels of central
control. Moreover, centralization has never been popular. This is due in
part to strong local social organization and a tradition of independence,
which means that decisions imposed from outside are usually resented
locally. Distrust of central government is also based on the experience of
authoritarianism and brutality.
60
In addition to Afghanistan's history of extremely decentralized
governance, the discontinuity of Kabul's regimes and factionalized politics
over the last quarter century of war have produced "a patchwork of
conflicting laws, legal systems, and an overall incoherent collection of law
enforcement and military structures, '6 1 at times even within single
institutions of the Afghan state.6 2 Outside of Kabul and in most of the
country, therefore, regional power holders-some holding official positions
and some not-exercise de facto political, administrative, and judicial
authority through control of their own militia forces. 63 These warlords, as
they are often referred to both inside and outside Afghanistan, are generally
autonomous and independent from any state control, and normally entirely
self-funded through profits from the opium trade and exacting taxes on
commodities or travelers that pass through transportation routes under their
control.64 Beyond the influence of official provincial governors and
warlords then, day-to-day disputes are adjudicated by traditional Afghan
shuras or jirgas (tribal councils), normally composed of the most
prominent elderly men of the village.6 5 Outside of the major cities, shuras
60. J. Alexander Their, The Making of a Constitution in Afghanistan, Conference on
State Reconstruction and International Engagement in Afghanistan, Panel IV: Re-
Establishing a Legal System, at 11, at
<unpanl .un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN018246.pdf> (visited
Oct. 2, 2005).
61. USIP SPECIAL REPORT 117, supra note 14.
62. Note, for example, the three main permanent legal institutions of the Afghan state-
the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Court, and the Attorney General's office (Saranwali).
All are "coequal in stature, and for a variety of political, personality, and turf-consciousness
reasons have fractious relations with each other." Id. Others have noted "the combative
relationship" that has emerged between the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of
Finance, discussed in Sedra, supra note 39, at 17-18.
63. USIP SPECIAL REPORT 117, supra note 14.
64. Id.; Ann Marlowe, The Afghan Model, NATIONAL REVIEW (Mar. 19, 2003),
available at <www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-marlowe031903.asp>.
65. USIP SPECIAL REPORT 117, supra note 14. See also Fatima Gailani, Human Rights
in Afghanistan: Law and Reality, in THE RULE OF LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE
ISLAMIC WORLD: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 144-149 (Eugene Cotran &
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have for generations played the predominant role in resolving disputes and
administering justice in Afghanistan by means of locally produced law
that---contrary to exotic depictions of "timeless law of the ancients"-
appropriately adapts according to local context and circumstance.66 In this
manner, non-codified "customary law,",67 de facto, governs the vast
majority of the population, especially outside of Kabul and other major
cities.
68
With such highly evolved mechanisms of localized justice in place, it
is difficult to imagine these tribal councils tossing aside their historical
roles as adjudicators in order to submit to, and be replaced by, state-
employed judges, carrying hot-off-the-press copies of the Italian criminal
procedure code in hand. Afghan history speaks to the resistance of
provinces to the imposition of law by Afghans themselves, let alone by
foreign drafted laws. 69 As they refused to submit to Amanullah's reforms
in the early part of the twentieth century, and likewise under the
Communist regimes in the latter part, local adjudicatory actors in the
provinces are likely to reject the latest attempt to impose centralization. In
this way, legal debates over the institution of a criminal code in
Afghanistan will essentially become political debates and struggles, with
Mai Yamani eds., 2000).
66. Afghanistan: Judicial Reform and Transitional Justice, supra note 44, at 3.
67. "Customary law" is indeed a problematic term, implying untouched, static laws that
have remained unchanged for centuries on end. The term often describes what in reality
constitutes a biased assortment of law that colonial regimes selected as manageable and able
to coexist with their own colonial rule. For example, see MARTIN CHANOCK, LAW, CUSTOM,
AND SOCIAL ORDER: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE IN MALAWI AND ZAMBIA (1998)
[hereinafter CHANOCK, LAW, CUSTOM, AND SOCIAL ORDER], for a critical explanation of the
"customary law" concept. Speaking of customary law, Chanock writes:
Much of the customary was the winning representations of intense conflicts
between ethnic groups, genders, and generations, winning because they found
accord with the ideas and interests of the colonial rulers. But they were only
partial representations of the value and practices in African communities, both
those inherited from the precolonial past, and those adapted and reformed in the
unfolding present.
Id. at iv. Professor Laura Nader has also criticized colonial (and neoliberal) views of
customary law as inaccurate and unrepresentative of dynamic indigenous legal cultures,
arguing "Research on 'customary law' illustrates that legal tradition is not petrified history;
rather, legal tradition is constantly being invented." NADER, supra note 11, at 66. While
several legal agencies working in Afghanistan use the term "customary law" in a similarly
homogenous or "petrified" fashion, this paper uses the term to refer to the diversity of
unofficial, i.e. non-state-sponsored legal systems indigenous to Afghanistan.
68. See The Customary Laws of Afghanistan: A Report by the International Legal
Foundation, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FOUNDATION, LTD. (Oct. 2, 2005), available at
<www.theilf.org/reports.html>; Gailani, supra note 65, at 147.
69. KAMALI, LAW IN AFGHANISTAN, supra note 18, at 1-2.
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volatile consequences for peace in the country as a whole.
It should also be noted that while local tribal elements and rural
warlords traditionally compete with the central government for political
control of the provinces, an alternative source of sociopolitical influence in
Afghanistan exists-the urban ulama, or Islamic religious scholars. 70 At
the core of Afghanistan's religious institutions, the Afghan ulama shared a
complex relationship with the Afghan state, but broadly speaking they
adopted pro-government stances in the country's history up until the Soviet
invasion.7 1 Professor Kamali writes,
Religious leaders in Afghanistan have historically been recipient of
government grants and subsidies.... The qadis, muftis, and muhtasibs
(religious superintendants) were keen enforcers of Shari'a which was the
authoritative law of the land. The rulers proclaimed themselves to be
patrons of the faith to whom allegiance was declared as a religious duty
by the congregation leaders in their Friday sermon of khutba. In sum, so
long as the government avoided radical measures against the religious
leaders and did not attempt a direct clash with the principles of Islam, the
religious leaders were, unlike the tribal chiefs, in potential alliance with
the political authority.
72
In spite of such historical ties even several strands of this influential
but diffuse class oppose codification, on both theoretical and pragmatic
grounds. Theoretical objections boil down to an opposition to codifying
Shari'a, out of fear of imposing human limits on Divine law. As the late
professor of Islamic jurisprudence Joseph Schacht pointed out, "Islamic
law, being a doctrine and a method rather than a code.., is by its nature
incompatible with being codified, and every codification must subtly
distort it."'73  Practically speaking, perhaps most problematic for those
seeking to institute a code is a traditional opposition amongst ulama to
codification due to a preference for case-by-case adjudication.74 Dr.
Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Professor of Religious Studies at Brown
University, explains in his work Custodians of Change: The Ulama in
Contemporary Islam that the principle arguments in opposition to
codification amongst ulama are that codifying produces a rigidity in
70. Id. at 6-8.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Quoted in SHERMAN A. JACKSON, ISLAMIC LAW AND THE STATE: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF SHIHAB AL-DIN AL-QARAFI xvii (1996).
74. ZAMAN, supra note 53, at 95-99. This is especially the case for muftis (jurists of
Islamic law who are trained with issuing verdicts on new and novel issues, i.e. those not
specifically addressed in previous jurisprudence).
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judgments that might contravene some of the basic discretionary principles
of the Shari'a, such as ta'zir,75 istihsan,76 and pursuit of the maqasid al-
shari'a77-the five underlying purposes of Islamic law. 78 According to this
view, codification is also a threat to the authority of the judge to decide
individual cases in the light of his or her reasoned judgment-as guided by
the foundational scriptural text, not human codes.79 Also, many ulama see
codification as directly strengthening the state over the ulama, and thereby
threatening to subjugate the latter to the former.8° In the context of
Afghanistan, these are all substantial objections Afghan ulama may raise in
challenging a criminal procedure code because of the inherent threat it
harbors for their legal authority and normative method of adjudicating
cases. This is all in addition to the traces of colonialism inherent in
imposing a Westem-styled legal code, an act not previously unheard of,
and which ulama have staunchly resisted by deeming as inauthentic,
obtrusive and unwelcome in several Muslim state contexts before.8' As a
75. Ta'zir: The principle which authorizes judges to prescribe penalties for offences in
which the original Islamic legal texts (the Qur'an, Sunnah [traditions of the Prophet], Qiyas
[analogy] and ljma' [consensus of the Prophet's Companions]) have not quantified a
punishment. While Ta'zir provided judges with some degree of flexibility in that "it is for
the judge to quantify the punishment in light of the individual circumstances of the offender
and the offense," judges must nevertheless abide by textual limits that prohibit various
punishments, such as those that amount to torture. MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI,
PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 417 (3d ed., 2003) [hereinafter KAMALI,
PRINCIPLES].
76. Istihsan: a principle of Islamic law authorizing departure from an established
precedent in favor of a different ruling for a reason that justifies such a departure by seeking
to uphold a higher value of the Shari'a, such as consideration of public interest. Id. at 323-
31,344-48.
77. Maqasid al-shari'a: literally, the "aims" or "objectives" of the Shari'a, it refers to
the five essential values that the Shari'a seeks to protect in its rulings: (1) life, (2) religion,
(3) intellect, (4) lineage/family, and (5) property. Judges sometimes use these discretionary
principles to overturn convictions or advance a public interest; in this manner it is a legal
correlative of "public policy" arguments in common law courts such as in the United States
and United Kingdom. For further elaboration on this concept, see WAEL B. HALLAQ, A
HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORIES: AN INTRODUCTION TO SUNNI USUL AL-FIQH 89, 112
(1997) [hereinafter HALLAQ, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORIES]; KAMALI,
PRINCIPLES, supra note 75, at 351.
78. ZAMAN, supra note 53.
79. Id.
80. Id. One may cite, by analogy, the traditionally protected concept of academic
freedom in the U.S., whereby scholars of various ideological backgrounds preciously guard
the right to pursue research and publish their opinions free from state supervision or political
pressure.
81. Id. For additional studies on ulama and their interaction with codification
movements of modem nation-states, see Brinkley Messick's historical ethnography of
ulama in Yemen, in MESSICK, supra note 51; Said Amir Arjomand, Constitution-Making in
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relevant example, Justice Taqi Usmani of the Supreme Court of Pakistan
has commented with regard to the region's experience with English law
imposed in the colonial era and its continuing influence in contemporary
times:
[E]ven if, hypothetically, everything that is explicitly in conflict with the
Qur'an and the sunna is excised from English law, that law can still not
be characterized as Islamic law. For the former is the product of an
entirely different context, and its guiding concepts cannot be separated
from the framework from which it has evolved.
82
In this manner the resistance of ulama to a foreign imposed code
complicates any efforts to build a rule of law based on codification,
especially given the profound influence and historically deep roots of
ulama in social and political life in Afghanistan.
83
A related contextual problem with the criminal procedure code is its
inflexibility to the ethnic diversity of Afghanistan. There are at least six
major ethnic groups in Afghanistan-the Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara,
Turkomen and Aimaq-though scholars of Afghanistan have recognized as
many as twenty-one distinct Afghan ethnicities in all.84 The New York-
based International Legal Foundation has conducted a survey of customary
law of the different provinces of Afghanistan, illustrating the diverse
systems of adjudication active across, and within, the various ethnic groups
and provinces of Afghanistan.85 Each ethnic group, each individual tribe,
each particular clan, and each unique village have evolved their own
highly-sophisticated systems of adjudication and jurisprudence, uniquely
adapted to local circumstances and cultures.86 Imposing an external code
translates into demanding the abandonment of these indigenous legal
practices and intermeshed social norms. Imposing a uniform code would
also demonstrate Kabul's lack of respect for ethnic diversity in the
provinces, by marginalizing local legal cultures and systems of justice in an
Islamic Iran: The Impact of Theocracy on the Legal Order of a Nation-State, in HISTORY
AND POWER IN THE STUDY OF LAW: NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY (June Starr
& Jane F. Collier eds., 1989); Lawrence Rosen, Islamic "Case Law" and the Logic of
Consequence, in HISTORY AND POWER IN THE STUDY OF LAW: NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL
ANTHROPOLOGY (June Starr & Jane F. Collier eds., 1989); S. FREDERICK STARR, ED.,
XINJIANG: CHINA'S MUSLIM BORDERLAND 27-100, 101-119, 299-396 (2004).
82. ZAMAN, supra note 53, at 96.
83. See discussion of Afghan ulama in NAWID, supra note 20.
84. KAMALI, LAW IN AFGHANISTAN, supra note 18, at 4; DUPREE, supra note 17, at 59-
64.
85. See The Customary Laws of Afghanistan: A Report by the International Legal
Foundation, supra note 68.
86. Id.
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attempt to have it one way in Afghanistan. This produces yet another
source of resistance and socio-political clash between the center and
provinces. On a related note, the tragic rise in attacks upon foreign workers
and those who cooperate with the central government in Afghanistan must
be examined in this light, as opposed to some vaguely-defined and diffuse
"Islamic terrorism." Indeed, contrary to the dominant portrayal in Western
media, the recently released Human Rights Watch report, The Rule of the
Gun (September, 2004), insists that while most of the attacks are blamed
incessantly on Taliban factions, the actual perpetrators are often
independent local warlords who view the central government as
encroaching upon their authority.87
In addition to the significant cultural, ideological, and political hurdles
to instituting a legal code, basic logistical challenges endemic to
Afghanistan's official judiciary system preclude its sound implementation.
The U.S. Institute of Peace describes the state of Afghanistan's state-
sponsored judiciary:
Afghanistan cannot be said to have a genuine system ofjustice at present.
To be sure, there are many appointed judges and prosecutors in the
country, there are laws on the books, and there are occasional trials, but
there is no functioning system. Court management is archaic or non-
existent, central judicial and prosecutorial authorities often have no
technical means of communicating with colleagues in the provinces, and
judicial appointments are routinely made on the basis of personal or
political connections without regard to legal training or other
qualifications. Moreover, the organization of the judicial apparatus fails
to comply with existing law in important respects.... [J]udges routinely
make decisions without reference to written law; there are effectively no
means of enforcing decisions; and despite a theoretical right to counsel,
there are virtually no defense lawyers in the country. To a great extent,
the written law in Afghanistan is not applied--or even widely known,
including by judges and lawyers. As one senior Afghan judicial official
87. The Rule of the Gun: Human Rights Abuses and Political Repression
in the Run-up to Afghanistan's Presidential Election, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH BRIEFING PAPER (Sept. 2004), available at
<www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/afghanistan0904/afghanistanO904.pdf>.
[11n most parts of the country Afghans told Human Rights Watch that they are
primarily afraid of the local factional leaders and military commanders-not the
Taliban insurgency. Far from a Taliban problem, most Afghans tell us that their
main fear isjangsalaran-the Dari and Pashto word for 'warlords.' They say that
Afghanistan has a warlord problem-a problem with military factions dominating
government and national institutions, including local governments and the army,
police, and intelligence services.
Id. at2.
2005]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
put it, Afghanistan "has many laws, but no implementation." With
apparent good reason, Afghans do not trust the judiciary, and avoid
recourse to it as much as possible.
88
While the interpretation above is problematic in its assertion that
Afghans "lack law"-a conclusion that can only be drawn by ignoring the
sophisticated non-state-based, unwritten legal systems that operate in the
primarily oral cultures of Afghan villages-it nevertheless highlights a
disregard for the Afghan state's official legal institutions and documents.
In this state of affairs, why is there such a push to impose a code,
displacing local systems of justice that are historically in tune with each
jurisdiction's constituency, and have evolved to be more sophisticated,
reliable, and trusted by Afghans themselves? Such measures demonstrate
the government's lack of trust and confidence in local adjudication
systems, a stance that will only be met by provincial actors' mutual
disregard for state-led centralization measures.89  To expand on the
logistical difficulties argument, most provincial courts in Afghanistan still
do not have copies of codes, let alone use them.90 These logistical realities
have lead even state-employed judges to defer to local customary law
principles over the state codes.
9 1
Furthermore, if a code is applied on the provinces, a fundamental
question then arises: who will regulate these provincial courts, overseeing
compliance with the state's official legal standards? Here it is important to
contextualize the introduction of Italy's criminal procedure code within its
larger scheme ofjudicial reform in Afghanistan. As the centerpiece of their
efforts to strengthen the justice sector, Italian legal technocrats have
decided that the most urgent need in Afghanistan is to extend the state
justice system to areas of the country where courts are presently not
88. USIP SPEIALREPORT 117, supra note 14.
89. Examples of a lack of regard for legal aid assistance imposed from outside local
contexts are plentiful to the observant development lawyer. Professor Ugo Mattei,
comparative law scholar with extensive experience in law and development initiatives in
Africa, Asia, and Latin America, stated that in one judicial reform project in Mongolia, for
example, rural courts were using recently distributed copies of the newly instituted codes
and legal texts as copying paper. Professor Ugo Mattei, Remarks to Comparative Law class
at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law (Sept. 1, 2004).
90. USIP SPECIAL REPORT 117, supra note 14.
91. Application of Shari'a laws: Judges Currently Apply a Mixture of Shari'a Law,
Afghan Customary Law And Statutory Law; Lack of Clarity Regarding the Relationship
Between the Different Sources of Law, European Country of Origin Information Network:
Afghanistan Politics & Law (National Law), at <www.ecoi.net/doc/en/AF/content/2/606-
670> (visited Oct. 2, 2005).
[Vol. 29:1I
Judicial Reform in Afghanistan
functioning.92 The Italian plan is to address this problem through a focus
on selected district primary courts.93  Thus, by focusing initially on
introducing the code in selected district courts, i.e., those located in
provincial capital cities, in theory these courts would also hear cases from
other districts in the province where courts are presently not functioning.94
Following this scheme, Italy is training an initial corps of twenty judges
and twenty prosecutors in this new code, who will then be assigned to the
selected districts.95
In this fashion, the Italian criminal procedure code is part and parcel
of a broader plan to professionalize and centralize Afghanistan's judicial
system by establishing district courts that will apply the same code.
96
Afghan and international observers "have expressed skepticism regarding
this plan, suggesting that an approach that focuses on use of a new code in
a small number of district level courts produces inconsistency and isolated
pockets of administration of justice., 97 Moreover, the absence of any real
administrative control over Afghanistan's provinces testifies to the virtual
impossibility of enforcing this procedure. 98 Finally, as a practical matter,
the layman's difficulties with traveling from one province to another, just
to settle disputes and seek justice that would otherwise be administered
through the local village shura (not to mention the latter's efficiency
compared to what a slow state bureaucratic apparatus would provide), all
serve as an additional barrier to enforcing a highly-centralized court system
in Afghanistan.
Given these tremendous practical challenges to the institution of a
criminal procedure code in Afghanistan, the question should be asked: Why
must there be such a formalistic professionalization of the law in the first
place? Why is there a need to undermine local adjudicatory customs and
transform local criminal procedure so dramatically, or to any degree at all?
After all, such measures displace the socioculturally rooted legal systems in
the provinces, particularly the honored tribal jirgas that on the whole are
more politically legitimate, historically developed, and ultimately respected
92. USIP SPECIAL REPORT 117, supra note 14.
93. Id.; Afghanistan: Judicial Reform and Transitional Justice, supra note 44.
94. USIP SPECIAL REPORT 117, supra note 14; Afghanistan: Judicial Reform and
Transitional Justice, supra note 44.
95. USIP SPECIAL REPORT 117, supra note 14.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Rebuilding Afghanistan: A Framework for Establishing Security and the Rule of
Law, United States Institute of Peace (Nov. 19, 2001), available at
<www.usip.org/ruleoflaw/rebuilding/afghan-mainreport.html>.
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on the local level.99
More than a few scholarly analyses have highlighted the deeply
entrenched respect, sophistication, and binding authority local tribal
adjudicatory systems (such as jirgas and shuras) hold in contexts like
Afghanistan and rural African societies.'00 On this note, Boston University
Professor of Anthropology Thomas Barfield, a specialist in cultures and
politics of Afghanistan, warned of the dangers of imposition of law and
ignoring local adjudicatory systems during a speech at the 2002 "Securing
the Rule of Law in Post-Taliban Afghanistan" symposium in
Connecticut. 1°1 Professor Barfield stated quite candidly,
I think one of the difficulties the international community is going to find
in Afghanistan is that the Afghans have a very well-developed structure
of law, of morality and ofjustice, but it's following a different logic than
our own .... [W]hile state structures are very undeveloped, the question
of running a society without state structures is highly developed. And
that is not something that people in the international community are used
to dealing with, and unless they do recognize the fact that there's a
substratum in Afghanistan that's a little bit different than the formal
structure, it'll be asking for trouble as it attempts to create a viable
Afghan government over the course of the next two years. 102
In Afghanistan, local justice involves a historical fusion of Islamic and
Afghan customary law that has responded to, and reflects, prevailing
realities of war. 103 "In the majority Pashtun community of Afghanistan, this
customary law is called the Pashtunwali."'1 4 In his recent study on judicial
reform in Afghanistan, law professor Mark Drumbl writes that "[t]he
Pashtunwali resonates among certain local constituencies as legitimate
local law."' 1 5 In concluding, Professor Drumbl stresses the central point
that it is "when international legal intercessions resonate with lives lived
99. KAMALI, LAW IN AFGHANISTAN, supra note 18, at 4-5; Thomas J. Barfield, On
Local Justice and Culture in Post-Taliban Afghanistan, 17 CONN. J. INT'L L. 437 (2002).
100. Id. See also CHANOCK, LAW, CUSTOM AND SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 67; T.W.
BENNETT, THE APPLICATION OF CUSTOMARY LAW IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE CONFLICT OF
PERSONAL LAWS (1985); MARTIN CHANOCK, THE MAKING OF SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL
CULTURE 1902-1936: FEAR, FAvOUR, AND PREJUDICE (2001) [hereinafter CHANOCK, SOUTH
AFRICAN LEGAL CULTURE].
101. Barfield, supra note 99.
102. Id. at 443.
103. Mark A. Drumbl, Rights, Culture, and Crime: The Role of Rule of Law for the
Women of Afghanistan, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 349, 352 (2004).
104. Id. (emphasis added). See also Gailani, supra note 65, at 147.
105. Drumbl, supra note 103.
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locally that their potential to actualize social change is maximized,"' 0 6 a
lesson apparently ignored by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs when
they drafted the new code.
Despite the warnings of these scholars, there are severe ideological
obstacles in the path of foreign aid agencies toward building a more
culturally authentic reform process in Afghanistan. As law professor
Martin Chanock has persuasively argued,
Western-trained lawyers working in developing countries carry a
problematic rule-based approach to the law with them; formalistic rules
make up the narrow lens through which they analyze legal problems,
creating an obsession with applying fixed legal standards to what are
often totally disparate social contexts, all in search of finding a tangible
net result and uniform product of "the law."
107
This rule-based approach is obvious in the emphasis placed on writing
a formal code of procedure and requiring its implantation in all levels of
Afghanistan's judiciary throughout the country. In this manner, the act of
drafting a code by foreign legal advisors and requiring its national
implementation actually reflects a colonial mentality, particularly in two
ways. First, imposing a code demonstrates a censorious view of Afghan
shuras, as if the latter were incompetent to rule themselves, and secondly, it
reveals the judicial reformers' fear of the unknown, since shuras are highly
localized, autonomous bodies that generally act beyond the coercive reach
of the state's authority.10 8 Furthermore, the drafters' clear circumventing of
Shari'a in the code reflects a disdainful approach to Islamic law, similar to
the Weberian derogatory view of Islamic law as the rule of a simpleton
qadi dispensing raw and irrational justice under a tree.'0 9 The latter image
represents a classic Orientalist view thoroughly debunked by contemporary
scholars of Islamic law, yet apparently still holding sway in certain
Western international development policies."l0 Professor Chanock's study
106. Id. at 353.
107. CHANOCK, LAW, CUSTOM, AND SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 67, at x-xi.
108. Id.
109. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: VOL. III 976 (1968), quoted in Chibli Mallat,
From Islamic to Middle Eastern Law: A Restatement of the Field, Part 11, 52 AM. J. COMP.
L. 209, 209 (2004).
110. For sample critiques of Orientalist perceptions of Islamic law, see Jane F. Collier,
Intertwined Histories: Islamic Law and Western Imperialism, 28 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 395-
408 (1994); EDWARD W. SAID, ORiENTALIsM 50, 65-6, 209, 255-56, 278 (1994); Wael B.
Hallaq, The Quest for Origins or Doctrine? Islamic Legal Studies as Colonialist Discourse,
2 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 1 (2002-03); MESSICK, supra note 51, at 58-66. For
example, Messick writes,
Among the colonial-era conceptions that contributed to decentering and bracketing
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of customary law in Malawi and Zambia highlights the flaws of this
parochial view that is characteristic of the colonial encounter, an
environment which has some parallels to the relationships between
foreigners and Afghans in Afghanistan today:
In colonial Africa the view that new law could be made only by state
command belonged to the colonizers as the agents of both state power
and of change. Colonized Africans, on the other hand, could not change
their law. The[ir] concept of customary law was racist because it
implied an absence of agency. The[ir] idea of customary law confined
Africans to a subordinate political place, and in a subordinate time.
However the fact that custom was and is continually being invented is
not a sign that it is spurious and specious, but a validation of its genuine
character as an expression of living interests and values.
II
In similar fashion, the disregard of provincial shura councils by
foreign agencies reflects a view of local Afghan customary law as static,
the discursive authority of the shari'a was that it was 'immutable.' This was in
contrast to Western law, which, it was assumed, 'responds ... to the ever changing
pattems of social and economic life.' The thesis of doctrinal immutability also
spawned related understandings, chief among them that the underlying system of
[Islamic legal] instruction was 'inflexible.' The attribution of an ossified character
to Islamic law fit general Western conceptions of non-Western societies as either
dormant (simple societies) or stagnant (traditional civilizations) until the
enlivening moment of Western contact or colonization. As a consequence,
patterns of discursive vitality different from those known in the West would
remain unacknowledged.... Following, in part, from the immutability thesis was
the conclusion that the shari'a was largely irrelevant.
Id. at 59. Compare such views of Islamic law's "irrelevance" with Messick's observation
that "[1]ittle attention has been given, by contrast, to the obeyed dimensions of the shari'a, or
to the extent to which its categories and concerns have influenced behaviors [in Muslim
societies]." Id. at 60. In an essay presented at the 1993 Critical Legal Conference in
Oxford, British law professor John Strawson argued,
[D]espite its changing language, the Anglo-American critiques of Islamic law
remain within the orientalist problematique. Islamic law has been represented
within Anglo-American scholarship as an essentially defective legal system. The
terrain of the critique has changed from the defence of colonial rule during the age
of imperialism to contemporary claims about human rights, democracy and
pluralism. The problem with this critique is that it replicates the power
relationship between Europe (and the United States) and the Islamic world. The
argument that Islamic law is defective nourishes the perception that European law
is complete. As a consequence, a genuine engagement with Islamic law becomes
problematic as every encounter is drawn onto the terrain of the orientalist
narrative.
John Strawson, Encountering Islamic Law, at <www2.iiu.edu.my/deed/lawbase/jsrps.html>
(visited Oct. 2, 2005).
111. CHANOCK, LAW, CUSTOM, AND SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 67, at ix. For further
discussion and arguments on the theme of neocolonialism in Afghanistan today, see
MARTEN, supra note 10 and GREGORY, supra note 10.
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frozen in time, and regressive, to be removed or "improved" in the post-
Enlightenment era of universal human rights-the latter concept
purportedly embodied by liberal Western norms of judicial procedure and
substantive law. Such views overlook the constantly evolving, highly
refined, and adaptive nature of local customary law mechanisms, systems
of law that, as in Afghanistan, have survived vicissitudes of war, famine,
and drought, and when compared to state-run judicial institutions and law
enforcement, have succeeded far more in maintaining relative social order
during eras of prosperity and national turmoil alike. 112 Essentialist views
on customary law also ignore the deeply rooted connections of customary
law with virtually all aspects of social life in a local setting like a rural
Afghan village, where each law or social norm is intertwined with another.
On this topic Dr. Laura Nader, Professor of Anthropology at UC Berkeley,
has described a common flaw of international human rights jurisprudence
in the tendency to apply what are often Western-derived norms in totally
dissimilar sociolegal contexts, as if certain social practices found to be
unpalatable to international human rights standards can be neatly and
cleanly separated from their local settings. In her recent book, The Life of
the Law, she notes:
Another contemporary example shows the pitfalls of applying legal
concepts worldwide, as if they were universal, without regard to local
context. Aboriginal customary marriages include practices that conflict
with human rights provisions, as for instance the practice of infant
betrothal. Diane Bell (1992: 349) has produced a nuanced analysis of
how the conceptual division between individual and collective affects the
rights of aboriginal women. When one focuses on the individual rights
of one woman without noting that marriage is a process that establishes
alliances between families and that such marriages have implications for
landownership and ritual obligations, the woman loses the checks and
balances that earlier worked to protect women. In addition, Bell notes
that women experience the power of the state differently than men do, to
women's disadvantage. 
113
While this paper does not argue that international human rights
discourses are fruitless endeavors in non-Western settings, it does imply
that goals of remedying social ills in a society are best conceived, and
achieved, by indigenous actors acting comfortably in their own sociolegal
contexts. International intervention in the law of another society,
112. Barfield, supra note 99; CHANOCK, SouTH AFRICAN LEGAL CULTURE, supra note
100; BENNETT, supra note 100.
113. NADER, supra note 11, at 220.
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particularly when it relates to social and cultural norms, tends to only
exacerbate internal conflicts by politicizing and distorting the original
issues. The latter can often have the effect of transforming local
disagreements into full-blown wars whereby parties can lodge their
conservative arguments in a call for defending the homeland against
foreign imperialist motives, thereby stymieing indigenously-supported
legal growth and a more organic development of the local legal system.
Such is precisely the predicament of Afghanistan in the current period,
where it is not uncommon for Afghans to construe the widespread
international attention to the conditions of Afghan women as another
missionary war on Islam and an attempt to demonize Afghan men, as a
precursor to outright colonialism of the country itself."14 These negative
developments could be avoided by first respecting local sociolegal norms
for what they are (which includes gaining a far deeper understanding of
Afghan history, cultures, and rural societies), considering the complex
dynamics of approaching another legal culture though the lens of Western
secular-liberal modernity, and by refusing to attack local sociolegal
customs as "the source" of human rights problems in Afghanistan. In an
apt summary of the faults of the colonial-local legal encounter, Professor
Chanock writes:
The essence of the failure of the colonial regime in the area of law was
that it heard only one voice, or rather it chose only one partner for its
dialogue with African culture. An approach to legal culture that
acknowledges the presence of many voices is the best foundation on
which to conduct the rights debate, as opposed to the essentializing and
dichotomizing views of culture. 115
One means of recognizing the multitude of voices in Afghanistan is by
not unilaterally codifying legal procedures (let alone imposing them), but to
respect the diverse forms of established adjudication that thrive, de facto,
throughout the country. If the rising Afghan state fails to do so and
continues to ignore local sociocultural realities, it will be setting itself up
for the return of tumultuous center-vs.-provinces conflict, thereby
delivering an ominous message to Afghanistan's fiercely autonomous
114. For a few fascinating discussions relevant to the themes of feminism, secularism
and cultural imperialism in Afghanistan, see Charles Hirschkind & Saba Mahmood,
Feminism, The Taliban, and Politics of Counter-Insurgency, 75(2) ANTHROPOLOGICAL
QUARTERLY 339-54 (Spring 2002); Anila Daulatzai, A Leap of Faith: Thoughts on
Secularistic Practices and Progressive Politics, 56 (182) INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE
JOURNAL. 565-576 (Dec. 2004). See also SABA MAHMOOD, POLITICS OF PIETY: THE ISLAMIC
REVIVAL AND THE FEMINIST SUBJECT 5-17, 36-39, 189-99 (2005).
115. CHANOCK, SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL CULTURE, supra note 100.
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tribes, and producing ill-fated consequences for the entire country.
IV. Additional Lessons From Relevant Law and Development
Contexts
The North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan province
of neighboring Pakistan, adjoining regions which straddle the Afghan-
Pakistani border and include large populations of Pashtun tribes, have also
confronted the issue of the central state's relationship to its autonomous
tribes. 16 The Pakistani state's response has largely been a grant of nearly
full autonomy. 17  Tribal jirgas have virtually an unchallenged role in
adjudication of disputes in NWFP and Balochistan. 118  Advocates of
administrative rule by jirgas have even defended their positions arguing
that international law protects indigenous people's right to autonomy. 119
Critics assail the Pakistani government for giving a free reign to the
independent tribal jirgas, which human rights groups argue violate
international law standards in their treatment of women and collective guilt
penal policies. 20  Other analysts have suggested a solution lies in a
compromise: a balance between maintaining the jirga system, but with
fundamental human rights (as defined by prevalent norms of international
law) to be protected by the State.
121
Experiences of law and development from other contexts provide
enduring lessons, however, of the danger of foreign intrusion on local legal
systems, whether in the colonial era, or in contemporary movements to
promote universal human rights or the rule of law. 12 2  Wael Hallaq,
116. Tanguay-Renaud, supra note 12.
117. Id. While tentative circumstances indicate the contrary due to Pakistani President
Pervez Musharraf's decision to increase army installations in these regions as part of the
continuing search for Osama Bin Laden, Al Qaeda, and Taliban renegades, judicial
administration remains in the hands of local jirga systems. Pakistan Targets Border
Militants, BBC NEWS, at <news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/southasia/3994721.stm> (visited
Nov. 29, 2005); Owen Bennett-Jones, Radical Change for Pakistan's Tribal Elders, BBC
NEWS, at <news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/fromourowncorrespondent/3985477.stm>
(visited Nov. 29, 2005); Jason Szep, Pakistan Seeks Reform on
Afghan Border, REUTERS, at <www.e-
ariana.com/ariana/eariana.nsf/allDocsArticles/09AB3564DODF847D87256E7500669119?0
penDocument> (visited Nov. 29, 2005).
118. Tanguay-Renaud, supra note 12.
119. Id
120. International Legal Updates, 11 HuM. RTS. BR. 32, 32 (Fall 2003).
121. Tanguay-Renaud, supra note 12.
122. See, e.g., JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND
FOREIGN AID IN LATIN AMERICA (1980); SANDRA B. BURMAN AND BARBARA E. HARRELL-
BOND, EDS., THE IMPOSITION OF LAW (1979); MARC GALANTER, LAW AND SOCIETY IN
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Professor of Islamic Law at McGill University, has argued that the brutally
intrusive processes of colonialism in the Middle East established a deep-
seated conflict between Westernizing secular elites and Muslim majority
communities that continue to hold fast to Islamic sociolegal norms in their
daily lives-a blistering divide that endures in post-colonial Muslim
societies until this day. The latter phenomenon has prevented the natural
development of a stable, self-sustaining and indigenously grounded legal
system in most Muslim states in the modem era. 123 Professor Hallaq's
remarks in the 2003 Hastings Tobriner Memorial Lecture are poignantly
relevant to current state-building efforts in Afghanistan today, deserving
full quoting here:
Having codified the law on the basis of Westem legal models, and
having virtually decimated the infrastructure of the traditional legal
profession, the nation-state jettisoned Islamic law altogether and reigned
supreme as the unchallenged center of legal and political power. I am
convinced that when the colonial powers pressed for these reforms, they
did so without understanding either the dimensions or the ramifications
of these changes. They surely did not realize that in doing so they were
introducing a deadly combination that would one day produce a troubled
and explosive area of the world. This effort at pushing traditional Islamic
law aside and rendering it inoperable if not defunct should have alerted
many to the fact that not only had the rule of law come to an end but that
a major gap, a virtual black hole, had fairly suddenly been created
without any real substitution or replacement. On the other hand, with the
colonialist creation of the nation-state in the Muslim world, from Syria to
Morocco, and from Iraq to Malaysia, a new political order was allowed
to emerge without the benefit of the traditional legal structures that had
systemically controlled the access by political authority to real wealth
(mostly concentrated in civil society but administered by the traditional
legal profession) as well as to legal and absolute political power. In other
words, there no longer was an independent legal system that could
restrain the powers of the new autocracies. And to make things far
worse, these autocracies harnessed the best of technology and tools of
modernity to enhance their dictatorial regimes, with brutal and tragic
consequences. Small wonder then that of the 53 member-states of the
Organization of Islamic Congress none is a true, real, or functioning
democracy. The majority is ruled by truly oppressive regimes, and any
claim they may have made in exhortation of Islamic law has been
MODERN INDIA (1989); Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms,
and the "Rule of Law," 101 MICH. L. REv. 2275 (2003).
123. Wael B. Hallaq, "Muslim Rage" and Islamic Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1705, 1713-14
(2003).
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superficial and ultimately designed to acquire what has been a thwarted
political legitimacy. With the exception of only a few cases, Islamic law
has meant little else to these regimes than chopping off of hands, the
stoning of victimized women, and public floggings. It is a sad comment
that these harsh penalties have come to embody and symbolize the vast
entity that we call Islamic law.
1 24
By imposing a foreign drafted secular code, Afghanistan may well be
setting up for the same self-destructive process and even a return to civil
war implosions, especially by marginalizing religious scholars and tribal
leaders who rely on Islamic jurisprudential principles as well as Afghan
customary law for their authority and legitimacy in adjudicating disputes in
Afghanistan. The resilience of Islamic law in several additional contexts
illustrates the danger of imposing dichotomizing legal codes that do not
draw from local legal traditions.1 25 For example, the dichotomization of
state law and indigenous customary law that stemmed from Dutch
colonization in Indonesia has likewise been a source of tremendous conflict
in the Muslim-majority nation even up to the present time.' 26 The failure of
the recent Indonesian government's marriage reform laws highlight the
problems with imposed codes that are not respected on the local level
because they lacked the involvement of influential religious actors such as
the Indonesian ulama in its legislative production and public education
processes. 127
Similarly, Kenyan law professor H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, in his article,
"Constitutions Without Constitutionalism: Reflections on an African
Political Paradox," emphasizes the importance of home-grown law. Far
from serving democratic goals, he argues constitutions in post-colonial and
developing settings can ironically serve to advance a minority elite's
interests at the expense of basic majoritarian rights.128 In another relevant
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., Mark Cammack et al., Legislating Social Change in an Islamic Society -
Indonesia's Marriage Law, 44 AM. J. CoMP. L. 45 (1996).
126. Id.
127. Id. Cammack et al. write: "The case of the Indonesian government's efforts to
regulate Islamic marriage practices illuminates the dynamic interaction between state
sponsored legal rules and a local belief and practice grounded in a religious worldview." Id.
at 46.
The data show that while there has been a steady decline in the number of girls
marrying below the age of 16, the marriage law has not had an appreciable effect
on that trend. We interpret this 'failure' of the law to affect behavior as resulting
primarily from a popular conviction that a marriage is valid if performed in
accordance with Islamic law, regardless of conflicting statutory requirements.
Id.
128. H.W.O. Okoth-Ogondo, Constitutions Without Constitutionalism: Reflections on an
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study, drawing from constitutional reform movements in Israel, Canada,
New Zealand, and South Africa, University of Toronto Political Science
Professor Ran Hirschl has questioned the value of constitutionalization in
culturally divided polities.1 29 In his own words:
An examination of the political origins of these four constitutional
revolutions suggests that judicial empowerment is in many cases the
consequence of a conscious strategy undertaken by threatened political
and economic elites seeking to preserve their hegemony vis-A-vis the
growing influence of "peripheral" groups in crucial majoritarian
policymaking arenas. In response to perceived threats by peripheral
groups, elites who possess disproportionate access to and influence upon
the legal arena often initiate a constitutional entrenchment of rights in
order to insulate policymaking from popular political pressure. Power is
transferred from majoritarian decision-making arenas to national high
courts, where they assume their policy preferences will find greater
support .... Under such conditions, increasing judicial intrusion into the
prerogatives of the legislature and the executive through the
constitutionalization of rights and the establishment of judicial review
may provide an efficient short-term institutional solution for ruling elites,
who, given an erosion in their popular support, may find strategic
drawbacks in adhering to majoritarian decision-making processes.
3
0
The above studies provide sociological evidence as to the inherent
problems with imposing Western legal structures in contexts that do not
share the former's histories, cultures, and sociopolitical norms. As a final
point of relevance in this section, the failure of the American Law and
Development movement of the 1960s and 70s has been well documented,
analyzed and explored.1 3 1 The main reasons cited for the failure of the
movement were American lawyers' parochial views of the law in non-U.S.
jurisdictions, lack of consultation with local actors, and inexperience in
interacting with the multiplicity of legal actors and layers of law in post-
colonial/neo-colonial settings. 32 Evan Davis, former Economics Editor for
African Political Paradox, in VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 222-33 (1999).
129. Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment Through
Constitutionalization: Lessons from Four Constitutional Revolutions, 25 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 91 (2000).
130. Id. at 91-92.
131. GARDNER, supra note 122; Brooks, supra note 122.
132. See GARDNER, supra note 122:
Have legal missionaries and legal elites learned from the law and development
experience? ... [S]ome of the American participants learned a great deal about the
legal models they carried abroad-and learned how little we know of law, change,
and choice in developing nations, and in our own. The entire movement could be
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the BBC News, recalls how "in the 1960s, there was a naive view that by
simply channeling some resources to poor countries, development would
follow,"133 overlooking social and cultural complexities and political
dynamics that would stymie reform efforts. 134  The forbearers of this
movement included European Orientalists who in studying societies of
Africa and Asia, implicitly compared the law of their own societies with
what they constructed to be monolithic, inherently flawed, and overall
lacking "non-Western" legal systems. On this topic, Professor Laura Nader
writes:
Those who first investigated the difference between Western and non-
Western law were largely armchair intellectuals, but they nevertheless
collected enough data to begin to document differences; law was
stratified variously by some into stages like savagery, barbarism, and
civilization-stages that are still found in Western thought processes and
law and development schemes.
1 35
The historical evolution of these comparisons culminated in the U.S.
law and development movement of the mid-late twentieth century. "In the
1970s, conferences on law and development were also plentiful, as was
optimism about tinkering with developing countries by means of legal
transplants, an easy, fast, and cheap fix; a developing country need only
buy a code book.'
36
termed 'educational,' though not in the sense originally intended.
Id. at 285.
133. Evan Davis, Why Development Matters, BBC NEWS, at
<news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/business/1875560.stm> (visited Nov. 29, 2005).
134. Id.
135. NADER, supra note 11, at 75.
136. Id. at 48. Professor Nader further explains the unique function of the plaintiff role
in societies governed by customary law,
In nonstate societies of the sort traditionally studied by anthropologists, the
plaintiff is motivated to secure justice, and certain kind of justice, because he or
she is plaintiff as well as victim. This observation is often ignored when Western
law is transplanted elsewhere, although the implantation of Western law models
has been the cause of major unrest in developing nations around the world. In
Zambia, for instance, the state as plaintiff began punishing defendants convicted of
cattle rustling by sentencing them to jail, whereas under traditional law,
compensation, not punishment, is a central interest for the "true" individual
plaintiffs (Canter 1978). In such situations, plaintiff energy is frustrated. In the
Zambian instance, the frustration caused major riots and precipitated a local
demand that cattle rustlers be tried by the local court rather than taken out of the
community. It is in the role of the active plaintiff that litigation in other societies
differs from ours.
Id. at 174. Professor Nader's comments highlight the inapplicability of a criminal procedure
code even further, which requires a state to monopolize criminal prosecution, which is
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Now in the twenty-first century, several scholars have cited a return of
the law and development movement, noting that the differences this time
around are a profuse Western confidence in liberal economic structures
following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the defeat of communism,
the open backing of foreign judicial reform movements by Western
governments and corporations armed with trillions of dollars, all bolstered
by the support of an open-ended and amorphous "war on terrorism.'
1 37
Have proponents of this new law and development movement heeded the
lessons of the past? In view of the imposition of a foreign legal code in
Afghanistan, the answer seems to lie in the negative.
V. The Future of Judicial Reform in Afghanistan - Warnings
and Recommendations
The plan to institute a uniform code of criminal procedure in
Afghanistan suffers from a lack of contextualizing Afghanistan's history of
turbulent center-vs.-provinces conflict, its extremely complex politics and
ethnically diverse societies, and multiple adjudicatory mechanisms that
govern de facto in rural areas. The decision to draft a code, however,
reflects an even broader problem with judicial reform in Afghanistan: a
tendency to impose Western legal models in the name of "development" or
"legal reform," goals which are skewed from the start by the lack of
sociocultural awareness of Afghanistan's legal history, principles of
Islamic law, or Afghan customary law systems. 138 In a country that has
clearly not possible in Afghanistan. For additional insightful comments and critiques of the
Law and Development movement by this author, see id. at 112-15, 133-35. Note in
particular her discussion of J.T. Guevara-Gil and Joseph Thome's paper Notes on Legal
Pluralism, a study which begins by quoting a question raised in 1984 by a Bolivian workers'
union:
'Why is it that Roman and Napoleonic Law are thought better adapted to our
reality than our own experience and age-long traditions?' They further note: 'This
poignant question challenges the whole project of constructing Latin American
nation-states as mirror-images of idealized European models of how societies
should be organized (1992:75).' To create national, integrated, and homogenous
societies out of multiethnic social and cultural landscapes is for Guevara-Gil and
Thome 'mission impossible.' They call attention to a paradigmatic shift
'qualitatively different to any previous ethnocidal, assimilationist, or integrationist
effort' as simply the right to be different. They portray the centralizing nation-
state as having a 'civilizing mission' in which law performs a critical role as a
coercive discourse imposed upon society.
Id. at 134.
137. Brooks, supra note 122.
138. Frank Vogel, professor of law and director of the Islamic Legal Studies Program
(ILSP) at Harvard Law School, apparently came to the same conclusion after a recent trip to
Kabul. The website for the Afghan Legal History Project, a program he introduced at ILSP,
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long resisted foreign intervention, authenticity of law and participatory
involvement on the local level are all the more important. If judicial
reform initiatives are to take firm root in Afghanistan, they must spring
from an authentic base of Afghan history and sociolegal cultures, of which
both Afghan customary law and Islamic jurisprudence play integral roles.
If history is not heeded here, judicial reform will follow the path of
Amanullah's Nizamnama reforms: resented and ignored on the local level,
they will further taint an already bitter relationship between Kabul and the
provinces.
In light of the above principles, this paper argues that legal aid and
development projects should respect the non-state-sponsored, customary
law structures that govern life de facto in the Afghan provinces. External
advisors must not assume rural Afghan societies "lack" legal systems; to
the contrary, provincial areas of Afghanistan have highly sophisticated,
adaptable, even formal legal systems that outside observers may easily not
understand or appreciate, and thereby dismiss as "informal" justice.
1 39
Local and autonomous legal systems serve many advantages, including
more prompt and effective justice processes than what otherwise slow,
inefficient, and heavily red-taped state bureaucracies limp to provide.
140
Moreover, legal anthropologists have demonstrated time and again that
local adjudicatory systems in contexts like rural Afghanistan carry more
authority on the ground than state-made law. 141
states,
The idea for such a project began with a visit by the Director of ILSP, Frank
Vogel, to Kabul in the fall of 2002, where he immediately recognized that
reconstruction efforts were crippled by a lack of understanding of numerous issues
concerning the role of law in Afghanistan.... The team's starting point was that
Islamic legal history is an essential and hitherto under-utilized tool for
understanding current events, and that Afghanistan in particular offers an
extraordinarily dramatic yet exemplary and instructive chapter in modem Islamic
legal history. Appreciation of the role of Islam in Afghanistan's legal past is vital
to ongoing efforts to establish a viable legal system for the future of the country
and its people.
Afghan Legal History Project, Harvard Law School Islamic Legal Studies Program (June
21, 2004), available at <www.law.harvard.edu/programs/ilsp/alhp.html>.
139. Barfield, supra note 99; The Customary Laws of Afghanistan: A Report by the
International Legal Foundation, supra note 68.
140. I am grateful to Professor Bisharat for bringing this point to my attention. For a
relevant discussion of the acute need for immediate and efficient justice in impoverished
communities (even in Western societies), see NADER, supra note 11, at 174, 220; Gresham
M. Sykes, Cases, Courts, and Congestion, and Herma H. Kay, The Offer of a Free Home: A
Case Study in the Family Law of the Poor, in LAURA NADER, ED., LAW AND CULTURE IN
SOCIETY (1997).
141. Barfield, supra note 99; Drumbl, supra note 103; NADER, supra note 11, at 51, 133-
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This does not lead to the conclusion, however, that international
development and legal aid agencies (which commonly employ Afghan
expatriates and refugees returning to assist in the rebuilding of their
country) are of somewhat marginal import in post-conflict Afghanistan.
Rather, many continue to play a fundamental role in rebuilding vital
infrastructure and promoting sustainable improvements in such areas as
public health, access to education, and civil society promotion such as
independent media training. 142  Most importantly, expatriate Afghans
working for such agencies could potentially play a vital role in promoting a
more constructive dialogue between native Afghans who have remained in
the country during the decades of war, and the present multitude of foreign
legal advisors engaged in rebuilding the country. In the area of rule of law
promotion, for example, legal aid agencies can assist constructively in the
training of personnel for the state apparatus, which has traditionally held a
presence in the largest Afghan cities, such as Kabul, Kandahar, Jalalabad,
Mazar-i-Sharif, Kunduz, and Herat. 143 The new state-based, official law
has a greater chance of taking root in these major municipal centers and is
less problematic of an imposition, because of the diversity of ethnic groups
and legal traditions thriving in these cities (due to increasing urbanization
and the influx of migrants from rural provinces to urban centers in search
of economic opportunities and employment). 44 The driving concept here
then is not to supplant non-state legal structures that have prospered in the
rural parts of Afghanistan, but rather to provide an official form of
adjudication for residents of the major cities - where residents are often
beyond the jurisdiction of their village or town of origin and associated
legal councils, and the multitude of ethnic groups from different regions
may benefit from a neutral third party and forum to adjudicate between
Afghans from varying original jurisdictions and traditions. 145 In light of
growing urbanization and rural flight to cities in the wake of greater
economic and educational opportunities, the Afghan state's legal structures
35, 174.
142. See, e.g., Soutik Biswas, Exile Returns to Help Afghan Women, BBC NEWS, at
<news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/southasia/3706966.stm> (visited Nov. 29, 2005). For some
examples of meaningful contributions international legal actors can often make in
transitional justice settings, see MANI, supra note 11, at 14-15.
143. Gailani, supra note 65, at 147: "Ninety percent of the Afghan nation use these
codes of honour [such as Pashtunwali] instead of official legislation, which is only used in
the cities." The paper hereinafter uses the term "municipal centers" to refer to these more
relatively diverse, multi-ethnic cities in Afghanistan.
144. USIP SPECIAL REPORT 117, supra note 14.
145. Rebuilding Afghanistan: A Framework for Establishing Security and the Rule of
Law, supra note 98.
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are far more suitable for these urban municipal centers than the more
homogenous rural provinces, where decision-making and mediation by
non-state-sponsored shuras orjirgas are the norm.
As to building a network of official courts limited to urban areas, this
paper proposes one final recommendation: to rework the formal criminal
procedure law code with the aid and participation of a diverse council of
Afghan ulama and tribal leaders. In pursuit of this goal the judicial reform
commission should recruit ulama from all the various provinces, sponsor
an inclusive assembly in Kabul or any other municipal center (similar to
the Constitutional loya jirga process), which for reasons of ijma" 46 would
endow a code with far more local legitimacy than it currently holds. Such a
gathering should focus on criminal procedure in Islamic law, such as the
stringent rules of evidence required for prosecutions, mitigating
circumstances for those accused of theft in a state of hunger, and other
potential annulments in cases of doubt, duress, or poverty-contextual
factors that are certain to arise and therefore must be taken into account in
Afghanistan's courts. 14 7  In addition, an Afghan criminal procedure
committee should go beyond striving to incorporate strong defense
protections for the accused, including prohibitions on torture, arbitrary
detention, and bribing of prosecutors-but do so by drawing as much as
possible from Afghan sources of law-such as the robust precedents for the
accused's rights in Islamic jurisprudence.148 In addition, the judicial reform
commission should continue to support the training of Afghan public
defenders, who similarly would derive authority from Islamic law in
securing defendants' due process rights, protecting them from wrongful
conviction, and arbitrary treatment by law enforcement authorities. The
International Legal Foundation's recently-established Legal Aid
Afghanistan project, which is currently training public defenders in Kabul,
146. Ijma': a unanimous agreement of Islamic jurists on a given matter that is subject to
debate. A legal opinion that is deemed to have ijma' carries significant legal authority and
is often considered binding, as opposed to any one jurist's opinion on a given issue. For
further discussion of the concept of ima', see KAMALI, PRINCIPLES, supra note 75, at 228-
63; HALLAQ, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORIES, supra note 77, at 75-8.
147. For discussions of such procedural safeguards in Islamic law and criminal
procedure, see Gamal Attia, The Right to a Fair Trial in Islamic Countries, in THE RIGHT TO
A FAIR TRIAL 343 (David Weissbrodt & Rudiger Wolfrum eds., 1997); JAMILA HUSSAIN,
ISLAMIC LAW AND SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION (1999), 134-45; M. CHERtr BASSIOUNI, ED.,
THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1982); S. KHARE, ED., PERSPECTIVES ON ISLAMIC
LAW, JUSTICE, AND SOCIETY (1999); MAHMASSANI, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LEGISLATION IN
ISLAM, (FARAH ZIADEH TRANS., 1961); NAGATY SANAD, THE THEORY OF CRIME AND
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN ISLAMIC LAW: SHARI'A (1991).
148. Id.
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Kandahar, and Kunduz, contains practical examples of Afghan lawyers
who are trained in both Shari'a and Afghan customary law, and then use
their knowledge of Islamic jurisprudential principles to defend their
clients.1 49 The supportive role Islamic jurisprudence has played in training
public defenders is just one example of how Afghan lawyers, judges and
independent legal scholars can engage international human rights standards
within their own interpretive framework of the Shari'a and Afghan
customary law.
To overcome legitimacy problems, the state's judiciary must
encourage the involvement of a diverse council of ulama from the different
provinces, and it has examples with the constitutional Loya Jirga process.
While virtually all development agencies have stressed increasing spending
on education, they should not shy from including traditional Islamic
educational institutions that will promote a dynamic and nuanced study of
Islamic law in the context of Afghanistan's grave humanitarian realities
and needs of a modem state. This will also alleviate fears and concerns on
the part of Afghans and Muslims in the region that the international
community is trying to do away with traditional Islamic seminaries
(madrasas) and historically valued institutions of religious education in
Muslim countries, to be replaced by Western-modeled secular schools.
50
149. For example, while witnessing criminal trials in Kabul the author observed that in
spite of the instituting of a new criminal procedure code, lawyers continually referred to
verses of the Qur'an, Prophetic traditions (hadith), or other well-known sources of Islamic
jurisprudence in defending their clients. For more information on project Legal Aid
Afghanistan, see Projects, The International Legal Foundation, Ltd., at
<theilf.org/afghanistan.html> (visited Oct. 2, 2005).
150. Dr. Saleem Ali, Professor at the University of Vermont and currently conducting a
wide-ranging study of madrassahs in Pakistan, aptly summarizes the current atmosphere:
The proliferation of madrassahs or Islamist schools in much of the Muslim World
has been noted with particular consternation following the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. The perceived linkage between radical Islamic education and
militant behavior against Western interests, has led development agencies and
governments to focus their resources on educational reform. However, there is
scant empirical research grounded in rigorous social science on the socio-
environmental roots of this phenomenon and its consequences. While the topic
has received widespread media coverage and has been discussed within the
broader context of radical Islamization, the research has generally been predicated
on observational accounts and anecdotes, that range from strongly positive to
vehemently negative. Akbar S. Ahmad regards madrassahs to be a 'cheaper, more
accessible and more Islamic alternative to education.' Singer calls them a
'displacement of the public education system,' Jeffrey Goldberg terms them as
means of 'education of the holy warrior,' Jessica Stern while describing them as
emblematic of 'Pakistan's jihad culture,' uses epithets and sub-headings like:
"schools of hate," "Jihad International Inc."
Saleem Ali, Pakistani Madrassahs: A Balanced View, at
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Continued reliance on foreign codes not only obstructs the natural
development of Afghanistan's legal institutions, but fails to draw meanings
from Afghanistan's reservoir of legal traditions that have been so
pervasively influenced by Islamic jurisprudence. Professor M.H. Kamali,
for example, comments on the dynamic nature of Islamic law and its
pervasive role in Muslim societies, as distinguished from the formal
instituting of a code:
[U]nlike its Western counterpart, Islamic jurisprudence is not confined to
commands and prohibitions, and far less to commands which originate in
a court of law. Its scope is much wider, as it is not only concerned with
what a man must do or not do, but also with what he ought to do or ought
not to do, and the much larger area of permissibilities (mubahat) where
his decision to do or to avoid doing something is his own prerogative.
Usul al-fiqh [Islamic jurisprudence; the study of the sources of Islamic
law] provides guidance in all these areas, most of which remain outside
the scope of Western jurisprudence. 
151
As a final note, it would be a tragic and lasting mistake for judicial
reformers to assume (either explicitly or implicitly) that Afghanistan's
"lack of a rule of law" or "chronic warlordism" is a problem somehow
built-in to Islamic law or Afghan cultures. A historically informed study of
the underlying causes of violence in Afghanistan reveal that ongoing
military conflicts do not boil down to innate cultural differences or abstract
legal debates, but rather fundamentally political issues-feudal lords'
rivalries over trade routes, resistance to foreign intervention and economic
adventurism, or even the rampant dire poverty that induces laymen to
participate in the lucrative drug economy, rural banditry, or foreigner
kidnappings in the first place-just to cite a few common examples from
within Afghanistan today. Such political and economic root causes are the
issues that need to be tackled and "reformed," as opposed to blaming
Afghanistan's provincial mechanisms of adjudication and tribal rule. As
argued by Columbia University Professor of Anthropology Mahmood
Mamdani, it is a commonly purported fallacy in Western policy circles and
popular media to attribute political instability, widespread violence or just
"conflict" in general in the Muslim world to Islamic cultures in some form
or another, ignoring brutal histories of European colonialism in Muslim
lands, the historical supplanting of traditional legal orders with Western
codes and artificial legislation, and constant foreign intervention that
constitute the chief causes of political upheaval in several Muslim country
<www.uvm.edu/-envprog/madrassah.html> (visited Oct. 2, 2005).
151. KAMALI, PRINCIPLES, supra note 75, at 8.
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contexts today.1 52  In light of the brutal history of foreign invasions,
occupations, and attempts at imposing colonialism, an indigenously-
supported rule of law in Afghanistan will not grow from the importing of
legal texts and institutions. Instead, reestablishing a rule of law in
Afghanistan must be pursued cautiously by respecting presently
functioning systems of legal order that are active in the provinces, and
limiting new state legal institutions to the major cities, rather than
supplanting traditional adjudicatory systems in provincial areas with
foreign codes that will neither be respected nor authoritative. Needless to
say, such efforts must be pursued in tandem with combating rampant
poverty and gross economic inequalities in general, in addition to tackling
widespread corruption on the official level. As to the future of judicial
reform in Afghanistan, the new Afghan state's failure to respect local legal
histories and customs, exacerbated by a reliance on highly-formalistic
foreign-drafted codes, will actually promote trends of impunity and social
disorder by displacing respected legal actors on the ground, precisely the
people who can actually settle disputes and resolve conflicts in
Afghanistan.
Conclusion
In the closing lines of his 1994 book The Fragmentation of
Afghanistan, Professor Barnett Rubin of New York University predicted
that if the international community did not strengthen its commitment to
rebuilding war-torn Afghanistan, a country that served as the "Cold War's"
most devastating battleground, 5 3 there would be disastrous consequences
not just for Afghanistan, but for the world at large.1 54 To claim that this
warning passed unheeded requires no elaborate proof-the somber events
152. MAHMOOD MAMDANI, GOOD MUSLIM, BAD MUSLIM: AMERICA, THE COLD WAR,
AND THE ROOTS OF TERROR (2004). For an insightful analysis of the root causes of political
instability in Afghanistan in particular, see Shahrani, supra note 12, at 212-42.
153. For example, see Professor Mamdani's summary of the tremendous human toll of
U.S. and Soviet proxy war in Afghanistan:
Perhaps no other society paid a higher price for the defeat of the Soviet Union than
did Afghanistan. Out of a population of roughly 20 million, a million died,
another million and a half were maimed, another five million became refugees.
UN agencies estimate that nearly a million and half have gone clinically insane as
a consequence of decades of continuous war. Those who survived live in the most
mined country in the world. Afghanistan was a brutalized society even before the
present war ['on terrorism'] began.
Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: A Political Perspective on Culture and
Terrorism, 104 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST 773 (No. 3, 2002).
154. RUBIN, supra note 31, at 280.
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of September 11, 2001, and its subsequent global conflicts, have imposed
an atrocious human toll around the globe.1 55 Three years later, with the
Taliban removed from power, a new government established, and
international relations resuming in full throttle, Afghanistan has received
billions of dollars in foreign aid for the purpose of establishing a stable,
secure, and unified modern state.156 A new constitution has been ratified
and its first presidential elections have been held, with recent parliamentary
elections conducted in September of 2005.'57 Some have thus concluded
155. Official statistics on civilian casualties in Afghanistan are a conspicuously absent
function of the "war on terrorism" (let alone investigations into errant bombs being an
actionable violation of human rights). Reports on this incredibly important, albeit largely
ignored, matter are thus largely investigated, gathered and published by independent media
sources. One noteworthy example has been University of New Hampshire Professor Marc
Herold's effort to document civilian losses in the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Professor Herold's Dossier on Civilian Victims of United States' Aerial Bombing of
Afghanistan, released in December 2001, concluded that as a conservative estimate, aerial
bombardment killed over 3,700 Afghan civilians in the first eight and half weeks alone
(aerial bombing by the U.S. and coalition forces has continued into 2005). Marc W. Herold,
A Dossier on Civilian Victims of United States' Aerial Bombing of Afghanistan: A
Comprehensive Accounting, at <www.zmag.org/herold.htm> (visited Oct. 2, 2005).
Professor Derek Gregory in his 2004 book confirms this study and writes,
The high-level war from the air also took a heavy toll of the [Afghan] population.
By May 2002 it was estimated that 1,300-3,500 civilians had died and 4,000-6,500
civilians had been injured, many of them seriously, as a direct result of American
bombs and missiles. Probably another 20,000 civilians lost their lives as an
indirect consequence of the American-led intervention; this includes thousands
who died when relief columns from international aid agencies were halted or
delayed, and others died through the secondary effects of targeting civilian
infrastructure (especially electrical power facilities vital for hospitals and water-
supply systems).
GREGORY, supra note 10, at 70. For more information on this scarcely covered issue, see
Ian Traynor, Afghans Still Dying as Air Strikes Go On. But No One is Counting, GUARDIAN
WEEKLY (Feb. 14, 2002), available at
<www.guardian.co.uk/GWeekly/Story/0,,649476,00.html>; Ian Traynor & Julian Borger,
Storm Over Afghan Civilian Victims, GUARDIAN WEEKLY (Feb. 12, 2002), available at
<www.guardian.co.uk/intemational/story/0,,648866,00.html>. Professor Herold and other
academics have also contributed to a dossier on an ongoing civilian body count for the war
in Iraq. As of October 2, 2005, independent reports estimate civilian losses as a result of
military intervention in Iraq to be, at minimum, 26,302; see <www.iraqbodycount.net>.
The BBC has recently reported this account. See '25,000 Civilians' Killed in Iraq, BBC
NEWS, at <news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/middleeast/4692589.stm> (visited Nov. 29, 2005).
156. Afghanistan Reconstruction: One Year Later, Achievements, Challenges, and
Prospects, DEVELOPMENT GATEWAY (Pat Daly & Judy Breck eds., Jan. 22, 2003), at
<topics.developmentgateway.org/afghanistan/sdm/previewDocument.do-activeDocumentd
=428010> (visited Oct. 2, 2005).
157. Eric Schmitt & Carlotta Gall, Karzai is Sworn In, Citing a 'New Chapter' for
Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2004), at A8; Karzai Poised for Afghan Poll Win, BBC
NEWS, at <news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/south asia/3949147.stm> (visited Nov. 29, 2005);
Philip Reeves, Afghanistan Prepares for Parliamentary Elections, NPR MORNING EDITION,
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that Afghanistan is secure on the path to democracy and freedom.1 58
Several agencies have exposed the fallacy of such erroneous
assessments and gross simplifications of the harsh realities that exist on the
ground in Afghanistan today.1 59 While various U.S. political figures
continue to extol the country as "liberated,"'' 60 and as world attention
continues to be diverted to war in Iraq, post-Taliban reconstruction in
Afghanistan has experienced an entrenchment of provincial warlords that
are immune from prosecution, 61 a 1400% increase in opium production in
2002 that has since barely abated, 162 and a scourge of violence against
international aid workers. 163 The latter has prompted the withdrawal of
such leading humanitarian organizations as M6dicins Sans Fronti~res
(Doctors Without Borders)-the world-renowned relief agency that
operated in Afghanistan throughout the Soviet occupation, civil war, and
Taliban rule. 164 To the surprise of many military analysts, the frequency of
attacks claimed by Taliban members or supporters have not abated, thus




158. See, e.g., each of President Bush's State of the Union addresses since Fall 2001, at
<www.c-span.org/executive/stateoftheunion.asp> (visited Oct. 2, 2005). Not one speech
fails to mention a perceived success in Afghanistan.
159. The Rule of the Gun. Human Rights Abuses and Political Repression in the Run-up
to Afghanistan's Presidential Election, supra note 87. See also Rama Mani, Ending
Impunity and Building Justice in Afghanistan, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
Issues Paper Series (Dec. 2003), available at
<unpanl .un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN016655.pdf>.
160. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address at <www.c-
span.org/executive/transcript.asp?cat=current-event&code=bush_admin&year-2002>
(visited Oct. 2, 2005).
161. See Mani, supra note 159.
162. Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, The Ironies of Afghan Opium Production, ASIA TIMES
(Sept. 17, 2003).
163. Charles Haviland, Afghan Aid Workers Live in Fear, BBC NEWS, at
<news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/southasia/3794973.stm> (visited Nov. 29, 2005); Stephanie
Holmes, Aid Workers Under Fire, BBC NEWS, at
<news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/southasia/3935805.stm> (visited Nov. 29, 2005).
164. Six Days Surrounding MSF's Decision to Withdraw from Afghanistan, MSF
Website, at <www.msf.org/countries/page.cfin?articleid=AA5AE5CF-05EA-4D43-
8DB 12C6450CBEA7C> (visited Oct. 2, 2005).
165. April Witt, Afghan Political Violence on the Rise, WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 3,
2003), available at <www.grailwerk.com/docs/washingtonpost03.htm>; U.N. Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Afghanistan: Wave of Attacks Alarms International
Forces, IRIN NEWS, at <www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportlD=41708> (visited June 16,
2004); Barbara Starr, US. Troops Unaccounted for in Afghanistan, CNN NEWS, at
<www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/07/01/afghan.crash/index.html> (visited Nov. 29,
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In light of such setbacks the preeminent body for enforcing
international law in the world has stated that rebuilding Afghanistan's own
legal institutions is "essential to the peace process.' ' 166 Yet, despite this
declaration there remains a paucity of research that addresses such critical
topics as the synthesis of Islamic jurisprudence with a modem state in
Afghanistan. The works of even the most monumental Islamic legal
scholars such as the Hanafi jurist Abu Yusuf al-Qadi (731-798 C.E.)-
whose celebrated treatise Kitab al-Kharaj examines the relevant topics of
rights of prisoners, rules of evidence, and criminal procedure-have been
completely overlooked, or at best ignored, assuming foreign legal advisors
were aware of them. 1
67
In the present state, and with the current approaches to judicial reform
described above, Afghanistan's prospects for long-term stability and peace
are ambiguous at best. While it is indeed challenging, if not impossible, to
point to any one set of recommendations that will pave the way to a rule of
law in Afghanistan, the goal of this paper is not to provide simplistic
answers, nor empty critiques, and for this reason it avoids offering
prescriptive solutions. Instead, the underlying aim of this discussion is to
promote a more constructive dialogue between the emerging Afghan
government, the foreign advisors and development agencies working in
Afghanistan, and most importantly, the local Afghan actors, in what has
proved to be an extremely complex reconstruction process.
The government of Afghanistan stands at a momentous crossroads.
Surrounded by international advisors and policy experts, each waving
golden carrots of foreign investment running in the billions of dollars, it
faces the prospect of rebuilding judicial institutions at the expense of its
people's history, indigenous legal traditions, and support of a broad base of
local actors on the ground. Such a trend does not portend well for
Afghanistan in the long term. Indeed, if we have learned anything from the
short-lived rise and fall of regimes that previously governed Afghanistan,
from the reign of Amanullah Khan in the 1920s, to the Soviet-inspired
communist parties of the late 1970s and 1980s, and most recently the
2005).
166. Report of the U.N. Secretary-General to the Security Council, July 23, 2003, quoted
in Mani, supra note 159, at ii.
167. See e.g., ABu YUSUF YA'QUB EBN IBRAHIM, KiTAB AL-KHARAJ 149-53 (Idarat al-
Qur'an wa-al-'Ulum al-Islamiyah 1987), especially chapter on Haquq As-Sijeen ("The
Rights of Prisoners"). Going beyond this single text, one may add to this the voluminous
jurisprudence compiled in commentaries on this work alone by jurists of the Hanafi
madhab, a school of Islamic law that has widely influenced sociolegal norms of a majority
of Afghans from the eighth century to the present.
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Taliban of the 1990s, it is that an Afghan central government must not
estrange itself from the Afghan people by unilaterally imposing ambitious
but parochial visions of what constitutes-often to them and their allies
alone-a progressive future and enlightened rule of law. History has
demonstrated that such top-down reform programs in Afghanistan, no
matter how coherent and promising to the outside observer (or to the
central government in Kabul), meet with fervent and ultimately violent
local resistance, producing tragic consequences for the country as a whole.
While the international community has arguably recognized its woeful
error in abandoning Afghanistan after the latter's appallingly costly defeat
of the Soviet Union, there remains a corresponding, equally important
lesson to be observed. Howsoever eagerly foreign investors now seek to
rebuild the country, if there is to be a rule of law in Afghanistan in
practice-beyond official constitutions and codes, that is-judicial reform
agencies must be willing to entrust Afghans themselves and the indigenous
legal systems they respect with the process.
